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The Navy is currently testing a new source selection tool
known as Red Yellow Green (RYG) . RYG helps field contracting
activities obtain the best purchase value by adding the costs
of poor contractor performance into the source selection
equation. The program should improve the quality of material
received by the Government and the performance of Government
contractors. RYG can be used in conjunction with Blue Ribbon
Contractor programs and moves field contracting activities
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The Navy is currently testing a new source selection tool
known as Red Yellow Green (RYG) . The test is being conducted
at five Navy field activities (Naval Air Engineering Center
Lakehurst, Naval Avionics Center Indianapolis, Naval Ships
Parts Control Center Mechanicsburg (Code 021, Level 1/SS)
,
Naval Supply Center Charleston/Naval Shipyard Charleston, and
Naval Supply Center Pensacola/Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola)
.
The purpose of the RYG program is to assist Government
contracting personnel in obtaining the best purchase value by
adding the costs of poor contractor performance into the
source selection equation [Ref . 1] . The RYG program was
designed especially for use by field contracting activities
[Ref. 2].
In addition to RYG, several other contractor quality
programs are currently being employed or developed within the
Department of Defense (DOD) that consider contractor quality
and past performance in the source selection process. Three
notable quality programs are the Blue Ribbon Contractor
program, the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting
System (CPARS) , and Total Quality Management (TQM) . This
thesis will describe the four programs listed above. It will
then evaluate the RYG program by comparing and contrasting it
to the other three programs, discussing its strengths and
weaknesses, and describing the status of the program test.
B. OBJECTIVES
DOD and its agencies have continuously sought ways to
improve the quality of Government contractor performance while
complying with the statutes, regulations, and policies that
govern the Federal acquisition process. Recent problems with
the quality of material delivered to DOD, many of them
highlighted in the press, have increased DOD's emphasis on
contractor quality management. At the same time, steadily
increasing Congressional oversight in the form of more and
increasingly detailed statutes and guidance have made
development of a viable program more difficult. Some of the
programs currently employed or under review by DOD commands
include the Navy's RYG program. Blue Ribbon Contractor
programs within the Navy and Air Force, the Air Force's CPARS,
and the DOD-wide TQM initiative.
One of these programs, the Navy's RYG, is the subject of
this thesis. This program is intended to eventually be
extended to all DOD agencies. It uses the data contained in
the Navy's newly established unified, centralized Contractor
Evaluation System (CES) . These data are compiled from many
sources including Quality Deficiency Reports (QDRs) and the
Naval Material Quality Assessment Office (NMQAO) . [Ref. 3]
Prior to CES, these data were found in many different forms
and each came from a different source. Now, they are
available in a single location and can be accessed by field
procurement activities from a computer terminal using an on-
line call-up menu. CES is used to classify contractors (by





or low risk (Green) .
Contractors who do not meet established criteria for RYG
classification are listed in the "Insufficient Data"
category. [Ref. l:p. 1] The RYG classification is used by
contracting personnel to either apply Technical Evaluation
Adjustments (TEAs) to contractor proposals [Ref. l:p. 1] or,
if the Fixed Price-Greatest Value method is employed, to rate
the offerors in terms of expected quality of performance [Ref.
l:encl (3), p. 3]. The TEAs represent the anticipated cost to
the Government to correct or take appropriate action due to
poor contractor performance [Ref. l:encl (1), pp. 1-2].
Proposals including TEAs are used to help determine a source
selection that will result in the best overall price to the
Government [Ref. Irencl (1), p. 6],
The RYG program is undergoing a one-year test coordinated
by the Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding
and Logistics) Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality
Assurance (ASN (S&L) RM&QA) which began 1 August 1989 using a
limited number of commodities.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is: How is the Navy's Red
Yellow Green program structured and how is it intended to
improve the quality of material procured by the Navy? The
subsidiary research questions are:
1. How are Red, Yellow, and Green contractors defined?




How does RYG compare and contrast to these other
programs?
4. What are the strengths and weaknesses associated with
RYG?
5. How is the RYG program being tested in the market?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the potential
effectiveness of the Navy's RYG program. It will analyze the
program in detail and describe other DOD contractor quality
initiatives in brief. It will compare and contrast the RYG
program to the other DOD initiatives and will attempt to
identify RYG strengths and weaknesses. It will evaluate the
success of RYG tests as far as they have progressed. Finally,
it will consider the viability of the RYG program in the
future, both within the Navy and DOD.
The research effort was limited by the short period of
time over which the test of RYG could be evaluated. Although
some test activities were able to begin implementation of the
RYG program on 1 August 1989, others were delayed. This
thesis evaluated the program very early in the test period,
and, therefore, relied on limited data currently available.
E. METHODOLOGY
Two methods were used to collect data and answer the
research questions. Data were collected from secondary
sources to obtain information about RYG and other DOD contrac-
tor quality initiatives. Data were collected from primary
sources, specifically through telephone and personal inter-
views, to add to the above areas and to assess the current
status of the test and the potential for future expansion of
the program. The interviews involved personnel at
ASN(S&L)RM&QA, NMQAO, the Naval Supply Systems Command, and
the five activities involved in the test.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The remainder of the thesis is organized into the follow-
ing chapters:
1. Chapter II, "Red Yellow Green Program," will describe
the RYG program concept and how it is being coordinated.
2. Chapter III, "Other Department of Defense Quality
Initiatives," will briefly describe other current DOD
contractor quality programs in place or under review.
3. Chapter IV, "A comparison of Red Yellow Green and Other
Contractor Quality Initiatives," will compare and
contrast the RYG program to the quality programs
described in Chapter III.
4. Chapter V, "Strengths and Weaknesses of Red Yellow
Green," will describe the advantages and potential
problems and limitations associated with RYG. It will
also discuss the status of the RYG test, describing how
the program test is progressing and attempting to
project how the program will fare in the future.
Chapter VI, "Conclusions and Recommendations," will
discuss whether RYG will be effective in improving the
quality of material procured by the Navy and will
comment on possible changes for weak areas of the
program.




The Navy's Contractor Evaluation System (CES) and Red
Yellow Green (RYG) program were established to both assist
Navy activities in procuring quality goods and services and to
comply with Department of Defense (DOD) and Secretary of the
Navy (SECNAV) policy. Specifically, DOD Directive 4155.1
states:
DOD Components shall assure that contracts are not awarded
to contractors with a previous history of providing products
or services of an unsatisfactory quality. Contractor
quality history data shall be maintained and used for this
purpose. [Ref. 3:p. 1-1]
Further, SECNAV Instruction 4855.7 states:
It is Secretary of the Navy policy that:
a. Contractor quality history data be collected and
maintained in a single Navy CES.
b. Contractor quality history data be used to assure that
contracts are not awarded to contractors with a previous
history of providing products of an unsatisfactory quality,
and to determine actions necessary before and after contract
awards to assure product quality. [Ref. 4]
The CES and RYG program satisfy the requirements of these
policies
.
B. CONTRACTOR EVALUATION SYSTEM
The CES is currently composed of data from the Product
Deficiency Reporting and Evaluation Program (PDREP) data base.
The Navy has plans to expand the CES to include other general
information about contractors such as financial data in
addition to information concerning contractor quality. This
expanded CES will be called the Buyer Information System. It
will be available to Government contracting personnel to help
them better evaluate offerors. At present, however, the
CES/PDREP is a quality reporting system managed by the Naval
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Detachment, Naval Material
Quality Assessment Office (NMQAO) , under the direction of the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding
and Logistics) Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality
Assurance (ASN (S&L) RM&QA) . [Ref. 3:p. v]
PDREP was established to satisfy the requirements of
SECNAV Instruction 4855. lA for "a product deficiency reporting
and data feedback system, maintenance of contractor/supplier
quality history and effective use of the data to influence the
pre-contract award process and formulate the basis for
necessary post award quality assurance actions." [Ref. 5]
The purpose of PDREP is to
. . . implement a product deficiency reporting and evaluation
program that will feed data back to those activities respon-
sible for design, development, purchasing, production,
supply, maintenance, contract administration, and other
acquisition functions and initiate action to appraise,
correct, and prevent product deficiencies, decrease material
ownership costs, evaluate contractor/supplier performance
and use performance data for making procurement decisions.
[Ref. 5:p. 2]
PDREP 's purpose, then, is compatible with the goals of the RYG
program. Therefore, it was a logical data base to be chosen
for the Navy's new CES which was intended to be used to
categorize contractors as Red, Yellow, or Green within a given
Federal Supply Class (FSC)
.
The CES is composed of contractor quality information
collected from the sources which are described below.
1. Quality Deficiency Reports (QDRs) . QDRs are prepared by
Navy field activities to document product quality
deficiencies, design deficiencies, or inadequate
procurement documents resulting in defective new and
newly reworked material being delivered to the Navy
[Ref. 6]. All QDRs are submitted to Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIR) , the Navy focal point for QDRs. Once
each week QDRs determined to be contractor liable and
with defects verified are transmitted by NAVAIR to NMQAO
for inclusion in PDREP. [Ref. 7]
2. Material Inspection Record (MIR). MIRs are prepared
either by Navy representatives performing technical
inspections at a contractor's plant or by Navy field
activities performing technical inspections upon receipt
of material. MIRs are submitted to the Navy Systems
Command having cognizance over the field activity.
[Ref. 3:p. 1-5] The Systems Commands (NAVAIR, NAVSUP,
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, and Space and
Naval Warfare Command) then transmit the MIRs to NMQAO.
The MIRs generated by NAVSEA activities are submitted
directly to NMQAO. [Ref. 7]
3. Reports of Discrepancy (RODs) . RODs are prepared by
Navy field activities to document receipt of incorrect
material, shortages and overages, and discrepancies in
preservation, packing, and marking [Ref. 6:p. 1-2].
RODs are submitted to Naval Supply Systems Command
(NAVSUP) . Procedures are currently being developed to
transmit RODs from NAVSUP to NMQAO for inclusion in
PDREP. However, at present they are not being
transmitted and, therefore, are not yet part of PDREP.
[Ref. 7]
4. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Contractor Improvement
Program (CIP) Alert List. Contractors are placed on the
DLA alert list if DLA has placed them in the CIP, if
they have received a negative pre-award survey, or if
Defense Contract Administration Services (DCAS) has
recommended they be given a pre-award survey for a
particular reason [Ref. 8]. DLA sends a hard copy of
the list to ASN(S&L)RM&QA. ASN then sends a copy to
NMQAO. [Ref. 7]
5. DLA Method C, D, and E Corrective Action Listing.
Contractors are placed on the corrective action listing
if DLA has documented deficiencies in their quality
programs. Specifically, method C indicates that the
contractor has a serious quality problem or has not
corrected a deficiency documented using method B (a
major deficiency) . The Government sends a letter to the
firm's top management requesting corrective action.
Method D indicates that less severe methods of
corrective action (i.e., A, B, and C) have failed. The
acquisition quality assurance program is discontinued,
and the contractor is advised that the Government will
not accept his goods or services until deficiencies have
been corrected. Method E is used to advise a prime
contractor that a subcontractor has quality deficiencies
that would justify method C or D corrective action in a
prime contractor and to request that the prime take
corrective action with his subcontractor. [Ref. 9] DLA
sends a hard copy of the listing to ASN(S&L) RM&QA.
ASN then sends a copy to NMQAO. [Ref. 7]
6. Navy Vendor Data Analysis Report (VDAR) . The VDAR
identifies contractors who, because of past poor
performance, should be considered carefully before being
awarded a contract and should be monitored after
contract award. Evaluation of performance is based on
data from pre-award surveys, product oriented surveys,
quality system reviews, QDRs, open DLA method C, D, or
E corrective action, and conviction of or investigation
for malpractice or fraud. [Ref. 8:p. E-5] The VDAR is
compiled by NMQAO based on past performance and input
from Navy Systems Commands and their field activities
[Ref. 10].
7. Pre-Award Surveys. Pre-award surveys are conducted by
contract administration offices when a procuring
contracting officer needs additional information to
determine contractor responsibility. The survey
evaluates the contractor's management, financial
capability, and technical capability to determine
whether he will be able to perform the proposed
contract. [Ref. 11] Only those pre-award surveys
requested by Navy activities are included in PDREP. The
Navy activity that requested the survey submits a copy
to the cognizant Systems Command. The Systems Commands
then transmit copies to NMQAO. [Ref. 10] NAVSEA
activities submit copies of surveys directly to NMQAO
[Ref. 7].
8. Product-Oriented Surveys. Product-oriented surveys are
technical product inspections conducted in a
10
contractor's plant when a buying activity desires to
perforin a special test on an item. They are performed
by DCAS when requested by the buying activity. If DCAS
does not have the necessary resources, the buying
activity may perform the survey. When a Navy activity
requests a product-oriented survey, it submits a copy to
the appropriate Systems Command. The Systems Commands
then transmit the surveys to NMQAO. [Ref. 10] NAVSEA
activities submit copies of surveys directly to NMQAO
[Ref. 7].
9. Quality System Reviews. Quality system reviews are
performed by DCAS. They involve an evaluation of the
contractor's quality procedures and verification that
the contractor's quality practices conform to those
procedures. [Ref. 9:p. 23] The reviews also evaluate
the Government's in-plant quality assurance program.
Navy activities receive copies of quality system reviews
if they participate in the review with DCAS or if they
request a copy. [Ref. 10] Copies received by Navy
activities are submitted to the appropriate Systems
Command. The Systems Commands then transmit the reviews
to NMQAO. NAVSEA activities submit copies directly to
NMQAO. [Ref. 7]
10. Certificates of Competency (COCs) . If a small business
is determined to be non-responsible by a Government
buying activity, the small business can request that the
Small Business Administration (SBA) determine whether
the business is responsible. If the SBA concludes that
the small business is responsible, it will prepare a COC
to document that determination. The buying activity
must then treat the small business as a responsible
offeror. [Ref. 3:p. 1-8] The SBA sends hard copies of
COCs to NMQAO for inclusion in PDREP [Ref. 7].
The CES data base excludes:
1. Material evaluations for base application and local use.
2. Contractors developing major weapon systems.
3. Medical procurements, material, suppliers, or
evaluations.
4. Subsistence procurements, material, suppliers, or
evaluations.
5. Unsatisfactory material condition caused by improper
handling after receipt, deterioration during local
storage, or inadequate maintenance or operation.
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6. Transportation discrepancies caused by the carrier.
7. Ammunition and explosives accidents.
8. Nuclear weapon procurements, material, suppliers, or
evaluations.
9. Naval Nuclear Power Plant primary system procurements,
material, suppliers, or evaluations.
10. Strategic Systems Project Office procurements,
, suppliers, or material evaluations. [Ref. 3:p. 1-3]
C. RED YELLOW GREEN PROCEDURES
A one year test of the RYG program commenced 1 August
1989. It is being conducted at the following five Navy
activities: Naval Air Engineering Center Lakehurst, Naval
Avionics Center Indianapolis, Naval Ships Parts Control Center
(SPCC) Mechanicsburg (Code 021, Level 1/SS) , Naval Supply
Center Charleston/Naval Shipyard Charleston, and Naval Supply
Center Pensacola/Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola. [Ref. 2]
The RYG program is a source selection tool that uses
information documented in the CES to evaluate contractor past
performance. Based on information in the CES, contractors are
classified by FSC as high risk quality performers (Red)
,
moderate risk (Yellow) , or low risk (Green) . New contractors
or those for which the CES does not have enough data are
classified as "Insufficient Data." Because the classification
is by FSC and contractor, one contractor may have several
color classifications if he supplies the Government with more
than one commodity. [Ref. Irencl. (1), p. 3]
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The general descriptions of the color classifications as
outlined in the program procedures are:
1. Red. The contractor's performance history indicates he
has supplied goods or services in a particular FSC of
poor enough quality to warrant requirement of special
quality actions and higher level review before contract
award. He is designated as a high quality risk.
2. Yellow. The contractor's performance history indicates
he has supplied goods or services in a particular FSC of
poor enough quality to warrant requirement of special
quality actions. He is designated as a moderate quality
risk.
3. Green. The contractor's performance history indicates
that he has supplied high quality goods or services and,
therefore, is designated as a low quality risk. His
proposal is evaluated without anticipating special
quality actions. [Ref. l:encl. (1), pp. 3-4]
Contractors are classified as Red, Yellow, or Green based on
the specific criteria listed in Appendix A [Ref. l:encl. (1),
attachment (2) ] . The RYG data base will be updated monthly to
reflect a particular contractor's current classification [Ref.
l:encl. (1) , p. 5] .
If no negative quality performance data are received on
Red or Yellow contractors during the previous 12 months, they
will be reclassified. Red contractors will automatically be
reclassified as Yellow, and Yellow contractors will be placed
in the Insufficient Data classification. If a contractor was
classified as Red or Yellow because of his reject rate on
MIRs, and if no rejects have occurred on the inspection of
five or more lots of material during the past six months, he
will be reclassified as Yellow or Green respectively. If a
contracting officer has reason to question a commodity
13
classification, NMQAO should be contacted for confirmation of
the current classification. [Ref. l:encl. (1), p. 5]
Contractor classifications will be updated by NMQAO
monthly based on new data received. After each update, NMQAO
will send a computer tape to each of the five test activities
reflecting the new contractor classifications. The most
current data will then be used by the activities in
performance of the test. [Ref. 12]
The RYG test procedures stress that a contractor's color
classification should never keep him from competing for a
Government contract. They specifically state:
The procedures set forth herein do not in any way obliterate
the requirement that a written responsibility determination
is to be made for every requirement prior to award. A
contractor's color classification alone is not sufficient to
determine that a contractor is or is not responsible without
further consideration of the standards set forth in FAR
9.104. [Ref. l:encl. (1), p. 4]
The detailed procedures of the RYG program are divided
into three categories, simplified small purchase, major
purchase, and fixed price-greatest value procedures. A
description of the application and specific requirements of
each of these categories follows.
1 . Simplified Small Purchase Procedures
The simplified small purchase procedures will be
tested at all five test activities. They apply to all oral or
written quotations solicited during the one year test for
selected FSCs that will result in purchase orders with an
estimated value greater than $2500. The FSCs used for the
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test were chosen by each test activity. They may be modified
during the test by agreement between the test activity and
NMQAO. Each activity can choose whether to employ these
procedures for purchases under blanket purchase agreements,
imprest fund purchases, and delivery orders against
established contracts or with the General Services
Administration. However, if RYG procedures are used for these
purchases, the activity must issue a written or confirming
purchase order to document the purchase for the file. Waiver
of the use of these procedures may be granted by the Chief of
the Contracting Office for all test sites except SPCC. At
SPCC, the Director of the Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical
Contracting Department must grant any waivers. [Ref. Irencl.
(1) , pp. 1-2]
When a purchase made under these procedures requires
a synopsis in the Commerce Business Daily, the notice will
explain that, although price will be a significant factor in
proposal evaluation, other factors, including the contractor's
quality history, will also influence the award decision.
Likewise, the solicitation document must include a clause
explaining the RYG program to prospective offerors and
advising them of its use for the solicited procurement. [Ref.
l:encl. (1), p. 6] The clauses to be used for simplified
small purchase procedures are provided in Appendix B [Ref.
l:encl. (1), attachment (6)].
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since the basis of a contractor's color classification
by FSC does not vary, the level of quality risk is the same
regardless of the procedures used for the procurement (i.e.,
small purchase, major procurement, or greatest value)
.
However, the procedures that contracting personnel follow
after receiving proposals does vary. Under the simplified
small purchase procedures, the following procedures are
followed.
First, each offeror's classification must be
determined from the data base—Red, Yellow, Green, or
Insufficient Data. If the contractor is classified Green, his
proposal is evaluated as received since past performance
indicates that quality should not be a concern if he is
selected. If the offeror is classified Yellow, the
appropriate TEA is added to his quoted price. The adjusted
price should better represent what the actual cost to the
Government would be (considering the cost to correct quality
problems) if he were selected. If the contractor is
classified Red, again his quoted price is adjusted by adding
an appropriate TEA. This TEA will be higher than the one
assigned to a Yellow contractor since the costs the Government
incurs while doing business with a Red contractor will
probably be greater than that of a contractor classified as
Yellow. If there are insufficient data to assign the
contractor a color classification for the FSC involved in the
16
solicitation, there is no basis for adding a TEA to his cost
proposal, so none is assigned. [Ref. l:encl. (1), pp. 3-4]
After TEAS are assigned to proposals from Red and
Yellow contractors, adjusted prices are used in the source
selection process. If a contract is awarded to other than a
Green contractor, additional actions must be taken by the
purchasing activity during the test period. It is anticipated
that similar actions will be required when RYG is exported for
general use by procuring activities. If award is made to a
Red contractor, for example, the head of the contracting
office must approve the award. The RYG test procedures
stress, however, that under no circumstances is a Red
contractor to be barred from competing for a contract. [Ref.
l:encl. (1), p. 4] If award is made to either a Red or Yellow
contractor, contracting personnel should ensure that any
necessary quality control requirements are included in the
purchase order [Ref. l:encl. (1), p. 6]. If award is made to
a contractor on which the Government has insufficient quality
data, even though no TEAs were assigned, the procuring
activity may choose to require greater quality controls than
they would if dealing with a Green contractor [Ref. Irencl.
(1) , p. 4].
The TEAS for the simplified small purchase procedures
are set at standard values [Ref. l:encl. (1), p. 2]. The TEA
for a Red contractor is $2499 and for a Yellow contractor is
$1255 [Ref. Irencl. (1), attachment (4)]. These values are
17
based on the anticipated requirement for the following
additional Government quality actions. For a Red contractor,
additional requirements would be Government source inspection
(GSI) , receipt inspection at destination performed with a Navy
representative present, and a quality assurance letter of
instruction. For a Yellow contractor, the requirements would
be GSI and a quality assurance letter of instruction. [Ref.
Irencl. (1), attachment (3)] The dollar values were
calculated by estimating the costs the Government would incur
in performing these activities. Specifically, GSI is assigned
a cost of $500 by estimating this would take the Government 14
hours at $34.18 per hour. Receipt inspection at destination
is expected to cost the Government $1194 based on eight hours
at $43 per hour plus $200 for material handling and $650 for
testing. Finally, the quality assurance letter of instruction
is estimated to cost $755 based on eight hours at $34.18 per
hour for DCAS personnel plus 16 hours at $3 per hour for
procurement representative personnel. [Ref. Irencl. (2),
attachment (3)]
2 . Major Purchase Procedures with TEAs
The major purchase procedures with TEAs will be used
at only two of the five test activities, SPCC Mechanicsburg
(Code 021, Level I/SS) and Naval Supply Center Pensacola/Naval
Aviation Depot Pensacola. These procedures apply to all
negotiated competitive solicitations with an estimated value
greater than $2500 for the FSCs covered by the test during the
18
one year test period when large purchase procedures are used.
As with the simplified small purchase procedures, each test
activity has chosen the FSCs to be analyzed during the test,
and these may be modified by agreement between the test site
and NMQAO. Waiver of the procedures may be granted by the
Chief of the Contracting Office or, at SPCC, by the Director
of the Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical Contracting
Department. [Ref. l:encl. (2), pp. 2-3]
When a procurement covered by these test procedures
requires a synopsis in the Commerce Business Daily, the notice
will explain that, although price will be a significant factor
in proposal evaluation, other factors as detailed in the
solicitation, including the offeror's quality history, will
influence the award decision [Ref. Irencl. (2), p. 7]. The
solicitation will include essentially the following notice to
offerors:
This procurement is part of a test of the Navy's Contractor
Evaluation System, "Red/Yellow/Green" Program. Award will
be based upon the Contracting Officer's decision as to which
offer provides the best value to the Navy
—
price, past
quality performance, and other factors considered. Details
are provided in the provisions entitled "NOTICE TO
PROSPECTIVE OFFERORS" (Section L) and "ADDITIONAL EVALUATION
FACTORS—TEST OF CONTRACTOR EVALUATION SYSTEM (MAJOR
PURCHASE PROCEDURES)" (Section M). [Ref. l:encl. (2), p. 7]
The clauses to be included in Sections L and M of the
solicitation are provided in Appendix C [Ref. Irencl. (2),
attachment (5) ]
.
When proposals are received, contracting personnel
query the RYG data base to determine the color classification
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of each offeror for all FSCs covered by the solicitation. As
with simplified small purchase procedures, a Green
classification indicates that the offeror is a low quality
risk and, therefore, no TEAs are assigned to his proposal. If
the contractor has a Yellow classification, the procurement
package and the contractor's quality history will be used to
determine necessary Government quality assurance actions and
associated TEAs. The TEAs are then added to the offeror's
proposed price. If the contractor has a Red classification,
appropriate TEAs are determined in a manner similar to those
for Yellow contractors. However, a greater number of quality
assurance actions will be expected when dealing with a Red
contractor. Therefore, the TEAs assigned will probably be
higher. If the contractor does not have a color
classification because of insufficient data, he will not be
assigned any TEAs. [Ref. Irencl. (2), p. 4] Additionally, if
the procurement is from a sole source supplier, no TEAs will
be assessed regardless of the applicable color classification
[Ref. Irencl. (2), p. 6].
The TEAs for major purchase procedures are based on
the specific quality deficiencies in the performance history
of the contractor for a particular ESC. These deficiencies
are used to determine which additional quality assurance
actions the Government should take to ensure receipt of a
quality good or service. [Ref. Irencl. (2), p. 2]
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Contracting personnel take the following steps when assigning
TEAS under major purchase procedures.
First, contracting officers ascertain the reason for
the contractor's classification being Red or Yellow by pulling
his classification code from the RYG data base (listed in
Appendix A) . Second, they decide which additional quality
assurance actions the Government must take. A guideline is
provided to assist them (Appendix D) [Ref. Irencl. (2),
attachments (3)&(4)]. As can be seen in Appendix D, the
contractor's deficiency code or codes are tied to an alpha-
numeric code for additional quality assurance requirements.
Now, contracting personnel perform the final step, assignment
of TEAS. The alpha-numeric codes for quality assurance
actions correspond to the list of quality assurance
requirements and associated TEAs in Appendix D. The TEAs
listed are calculated in the same way as those used in the
simplified small purchase procedures. Specific calculations
for each TEA are detailed in Appendix D. The test procedures
stress, however, that the costs on which the listed TEAs are
based are provided as examples. Since labor rates and test
costs may vary considerably between procuring activities, each
test activity should recalculate the TEAs to reflect the
procuring activity's estimated costs.
After TEAs are assigned to appropriate proposals, all
proposals are evaluated together (using adjusted prices for
contractor's assigned a TEA) [Ref. l:encl. (2), p. 6]. If the
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contract is awarded to a Red or Yellow contractor, the
contracting officer must ensure that the additional quality
assurance actions used to calculate TEAs are called out as
requirements in the contract [Ref. l:encl. (2), p. 7]. If the
contract is awarded to a Red offeror, approval for the award
must be granted by the head of the contracting office [Ref.
Irencl. (2), p. 4]. If a contractor on which the Government
has insufficient quality data wins the award, the procuring
activity will require appropriate quality assurance actions to
ensure a certain quality level even though TEAs were not
assigned [Ref. l:encl. (2), p. 4].
3 . Major Purchase Procedures with Fixed Price-Greatest
Value
The greatest value procedures will be used at only
three of the five test activities; Naval Air and Engineering
Center Lakehurst, Naval Avionics Center Indianapolis, and
Naval Supply Center Charleston/Naval Shipyard Charleston [Ref.
l:encl. (3), p. 2]. These procedures apply to all negotiated
competitive solicitations with an estimated value greater than
$2500 for the FSCs covered by the test during the one year
test period where sealed bidding procedures would otherwise be
most appropriate [Ref. Irencl. (3), p. 2]. Each test activity
has chosen the FSCs that will be covered by the test; these
may be modified by agreement between the activity and NMQAO
[Ref. l;encl. (3), p. 3]. Waiver of the procedures may be
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granted by the Chief of the Contracting Office [Ref. l:encl.
(3) , p. 3].
Solicitations prepared under these procedures will
include the same notice used under the major purchase
procedures employing TEAs [Ref. l:encl. (3), p. 7]. The
clauses to be included in Sections L and M of the solicitation
are provided in Appendix E [Ref. Irencl. (3), attachment (3)].
The source selection/evaluation plan will be prepared by the
Quality staff and will specify the criteria to be used in
evaluating Red, Yellow, and Green commodities. This plan will
be forwarded with the procurement request to the contracting
officer for review and approval. [Ref. l:encl. (3), p. 3]
For those commodities covered by these procedures, the source
selection/evaluation plan will assign price a minimum weight
of 40 percent, with the remainder assigned to quality
assurance considerations under RYG procedures [Ref. Irencl.
(3), p. 2]. During the test, no factors other than these two
shall be considered without prior approval from Naval Supply
Systems Command (NAVSUP) Code 02 via NAVSUP Code 021 [Ref.
Irencl. (3), p. 2]. Appendix F [Ref. Irencl. (3), p. 8]
provides an example of the RYG evaluation portion of the
source select ion/evaluation method.
If a contractor is determined to be Green, he will
normally be rated as "Excellent" or "Good." A Yellow
classification will normally carry with it a rating of "Good,"
"Average," or "Marginal." Red commodities will usually be
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rated "Marginal" or "Unacceptable." If there are insufficient
data to evaluate the offeror, the proposal will be considered
technically acceptable and will be evaluated solely on the
basis of price. The contracting officer can exercise
discretion in the use of adjectives (i.e., excellent, good,
etc.) for each color classification or other locally
determined source selection criteria. [Ref. l:encl. (3), pp.
4-5]
When proposals are received, the contracting office
will forward the names and Commercial and Government Entity
(CAGE) codes of all offerors to the Quality staff. The
Quality staff will determine the color classification and the
associated reason codes for each offeror for each FSC. They
will then assign ratings to each offeror based on the criteria
outlined in the source selection plan. If commodities of
different offerors lie within the same color classification,
their relative differences will be explained in an
accompanying narrative. This evaluation will be forwarded to
the contracting office. [Ref. Irencl. (3), p. 3]
If the contract is awarded to a Red or Yellow
contractor, the Quality staff will determine any necessary
additional quality assurance requirements that should be
imposed on the contractor. The contracting officer will
ensure that these are included in the contract. [Ref. Irencl.
(3), p. 3] If the contract is awarded to a Red contractor.
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approval for the award must be granted by the head of the
contracting office [Ref. Irencl. (3), p. 3].
D. SUMMARY
This chapter described the Navy's RYG program. First, it
explained reasons behind establishment of the program.
Second, it described the CES data base on which the program is
based. Finally, it detailed the test procedures that are
being used to implement the program. The next chapter will
briefly describe three other current DOD contractor quality
programs.
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III. OTHER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE QUALITY INITIATIVES
A. INTRODUCTION
One factor in the researcher's evaluation of the Red
Yellow Green (RYG) program is an assessment of how this
program compares with other contractor quality programs being
used or considered for use by the Navy. Three programs
evaluated by the researcher are the Air Force Contractor
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) , the Naval
Avionics Center (NAC) Indianapolis Blue Ribbon Contractor
program, and the Department of Defense (DOD) Total Quality
Management (TQM) initiative. These three programs were chosen
for the assessment because each has been considered for use
by the Navy as an alternative to RYG. Therefore, a discussion
of the merits and shortcomings of these programs and their
relationship to RYG is considered important. The evaluation
described above will be the subject of Chapter IV of this
thesis. In preparation for the assessment in Chapter IV, this
chapter provides background information on the procedures
associated with each of the three programs.
B. CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORTING SYSTEM
The first program evaluated is CPARS used by the Air
Force. As stated in Air Force Systems Command (AFSC)
Regulation 800-54, "The sole purpose of CPARS is to provide
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for a command-wide performance data base used in AFSC source
selections." [Ref. 13] CPARS currently includes 84
contractors and their divisions and subsidiaries. These
contractors were chosen because the Air Force conducts most of
its business with them. Therefore, it was determined that the
benefits of maintaining performance data on them would be
worth the effort involved in the CPARS process. [Ref. 14] A
Contractor Performance Assessment Report (CPAR) is prepared
on contracts with the 84 contractors included in the program
valued at more than $5 million. Preparation of the reports
are further limited to contracts for concept demonstration and
validation, full-scale development, and full-rate production
and deployment. The program excludes contracts for laboratory
work, services, and operations and maintenance. [Ref. 13 :p.
1] Following are the areas of contractor performance
evaluated in the CPAR:






5. Test and evaluation.










10. Other areas unique to the contract evaluated. [Ref. 15]
The CPAR is prepared by the program director or program
manager. An initial CPAR for a new contract is prepared
between six months and one year after contract award.
Following this, CPARs are submitted annually during the
contract performance period. Additional CPARs are completed
when the program manager changes or if the program manager
determines that a contractor's performance has changed
sufficiently to warrant modification of the most recent CPAR.
In addition, the contractor can request that a CPAR be
completed before the annual report is prepared if he believes
that his performance has changed enough to alter the
assessment. The final CPAR is prepared within six months
after the final major end item is delivered or when a contract
is terminated. [Ref. 13 :p. 2]
Preparation of the CPAR involves four steps. First, the
program manager or engineer responsible for the contract
prepares a preliminary assessment with associated
documentation. Second, the program manager forwards the
original of the preliminary CPAR to the contractor and retains
a copy. The contractor has 3 days to respond to the CPAR.
Upon receiving a response from the contractor or 3 days after
transmitting the CPAR to the contractor, whichever occurs
first, the program manager takes the third step and signs the
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CPAR. He may first revise his evaluation if the contractor's
response indicates that a change is appropriate. Finally, the
program manager sends the signed CPAR with its attachments to
the Product Division of the AFSC having cognizance over his
program for input into the command-wide data base. [Ref.
13:p. 2]
As part of his assessment, the program manager translates
his evaluation of the contractor in each of the ten
performance evaluation areas into a color classification. The
following is a description of the criteria he must use in
assigning colors:
Blue (Exceptional) . Indicates performance clearly
exceeds contractual requirements. The area of evaluation
contains few minor problems for which corrective actions
appear highly effective. For cost performance, blue
indicates a positive cost variance.
Green (Satisfactory) . Indicates performance clearly
meets contractual requirements. The area of evaluation
contains some minor problems for which corrective actions
appear satisfactory. For cost performance, green indicates
no cost variance or a negative cost variance greater than
zero but less than or equal to five percent.
Yellow (Marginal) . Indicates performance meets
contractual requirements. The area of evaluation contains
a serious problem for which corrective actions have not yet
been identified, appear only marginally effective, or have
not been fully implemented. For cost performance, yellow
indicates a negative cost variance greater than five percent
but less than or equal to 15 percent.
Red (Unsatisfactory) . Indicates the contractor is in
danger of not being able to satisfy contractual requirements
and recovery is not likely in a timely manner. The area of
evaluation contains serious problems for which corrective
actions appear ineffective. For cost performance, red
indicates a negative cost variance greater than 15
percent. [Ref. 13:p. 7]
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since each area is evaluated by color, a contractor might
receive several color classifications under one contract. For
example, he might be classified Red in quality. Green in cost
control, and Blue in the remainder.
When making assessments of contractors, the AFSC
Regulation covering CPARS cautions program managers to base
their evaluations on facts. Their assessments should be
supported by contract management data "such as cost
performance reports, technical interchange meetings, financial
solvency assessments, production management reviews,
contractor operations reviews, functional performance
evaluations, and earned contract incentives." [Ref. 13 :p. 1]
The Regulation specifically states, "Subjective assessments
concerning the causes or ramifications of the contractor's
performance should be provided; however, speculation or
conjecture should not be included." [Ref. 13: p. 1]
The intention of the program is that during source
evaluation, CPARs will be used to evaluate a contractor's past
performance and assess the risk involved in doing business for
the contract under consideration. Specifically, during the
source selection process, the contracting officer will check
the CPARs of contractors submitting proposals. If he
determines that the effort described in the CPARs applies to
the current procurement, they will be assembled into a report
for the Performance Risk Analysis Group (PRAG) . The PRAG
considers the CPARs along with other contractor past
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performance data to determine contractor risk. The PRAG
usually expresses contractor risk as low, medium, or high.
This risk assessment is then used as part of the source
selection. [Ref. 14]
At present, each Product Division within the AFSC
maintains a complete set of hard copy CPARs. The Air Force
intends eventually to automate CPARS. The automation effort
has been delayed for two reasons. First, the resources
required to input the CPARs and ensure compatibility with the
computer hardware at all commands are not currently available.
Second, the Air Force is still developing a method to ensure
the security of the automated data. [Ref. 14]
Each CPAR will be retained for five years unless the
program manager requests a longer retention period. CPARs are
considered source selection sensitive because they will be
used for procurements throughout their retention period. They
may also contain proprietary information. Therefore, all
CPARs and attachments will be marked "For Official Use Only/
Source Selection Sensitive." Additionally, the forms and the
data base (if automated) must be protected from disclosure to
organizations or personnel not involved in the source
selection process. [Ref. 13:p. 3]
C. BLUE RIBBON CONTRACTOR PROGRAM
The Blue Ribbon Contractor program at NAC Indianapolis
began in December 1987. It was inspired by the Packard
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Commission recommendations of 1986 [Ref. 16] and the Blue
Ribbon Contractor program at Tinker Air Force Base begun a
year earlier [Ref. 17]. NAC has attempted to learn from some
of the difficulties experienced at Tinker and has tailored the
program to respond to their concerns and conform to their
resource constraints [Ref. 18].
The program at NAC is applied to contracts, purchase
orders, and blanket purchase agreements with up to a $25,000
estimated value [Ref. 16:p. 41]. Procurements made for the
bomb-rack program, which have historically caused difficulties
for NAC, are excepted from this dollar limit and are all
included in the Blue Ribbon Contractor program [Ref. 19].
Other exemptions to the program are procurements awarded via
sealed bidding procedures and involving small, disadvantaged
business set-aside awards. Additionally, the program is not
a substitute for procedures governing contractor respon-
sibility determination [Ref. 19:p. 2].
In order to qualify as a Blue Ribbon contractor, a
contractor must first apply in writing to NAC. If he has made
one delivery during the last 12 months, he will be placed on
the list in that category. To receive the benefits of being
designated a Blue Ribbon contractor, however, he must have and
maintain an on-time delivery rate of 95 percent or greater.
[Ref. 19 :p. 2] This delivery rate is calculated by dividing
the number of delinquent orders by the number of open orders
and multiplying by 100 [Ref. 18]. Only data collected at NAC
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Indianapolis are used in determining this delivery rate [Ref.
19:p. 3]. If a Blue Ribbon contractor does not qualify to
receive the benefits of Blue Ribbon status upon application,
or if his on-tiitie delivery rate drops below 95 percent, he is
notified that he is still listed as a Blue Ribbon contractor,
but he cannot exercise the benefits of the program until his
delivery rate improves [Ref. 18].
There are three benefits accruing to Blue Ribbon
contractors with a qualifying delivery rate. First, the
contracting officer has the authority to award to a Blue
Ribbon contractor over other offerors at a price up to ten
percent higher than the lowest priced responsible offeror. If
the procurement is in support of the Navy bomb rack program,
the contracting officer has the authority to award to a Blue
Ribbon contractor at a price up to 2 percent higher than the
lowest priced responsible offeror. [Ref. 19 :p. 1] Second,
NAC Indianapolis solicits Blue Ribbon contractors to the
maximum extent possible. The bidders list is rotated, but 70
percent of it is made up of Blue Ribbon contractors. [Ref.
18] Third, Blue Ribbon contractors are permitted to use their
status in their marketing programs [Ref. 18].
So far, the Blue Ribbon Contractor program has resulted in
only 3.5 percent of awards (of contracts in the program) being
made to Blue Ribbon contractors that were not the lowest
priced responsible offerors. However, the delinquency rate on
blanket purchase agreements has dropped from 67 percent before
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the start of the program to 8 . 7 percent in July 1989. Seventy
percent of the suppliers awarded contracts in July 1989 are
the same suppliers that were receiving awards when the program
began. One protest has been filed by a low offerer who lost
a contract to a higher priced Blue Ribbon contractor. The
General Accounting Office dismissed the protest because it was
not timely. [Ref. 18] Therefore, no protest related to the
Blue Ribbon Contractor program has yet tested the program's
criteria.
D. TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT
TQM is a management style introduced to the Japanese in
the late 1940s by Americans participating in the post-World
War II effort to rebuild Japan. TQM proved to be a very
successful management method in Japan. As a result, it is
gaining an increasing following within U.S. industry trying
to regain competitive position both internationally and
domestically. Based on successes in Japan and within the
U.S., DOD is attempting to adopt TQM in an effort to operate
more efficiently in a time of dwindling resources. This
section of Chapter III will attempt to describe the TQM effort
as it applies to DOD and, more specifically, DOD procurement.
First, it will describe TQM in general, concentrating the
discussion on those aspects of TQM that most directly impact
upon procurement practices and, therefore, that would compete
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with RYG. Second, it will outline current DOD implementation
plans related to acquisition.
1. TQM Implementation—General
Adopting TQM means that everyone within an
organization must be involved in improving the quality of
their product. Whether they are manufacturing a product or
preparing documents, everyone produces something and every
product has a customer. Therefore, everyone in the
organization can improve quality. The basic theory behind TQM
is that as quality improves, productivity improves because
rework is reduced [Ref . 20] . As quality and productivity
rise, competitive position also improves [Ref. 21]
.
One of the key figures in the introduction of TQM to
the Japanese is Dr. W. Edwards Deming. Dr. Deming has devised
14 principles for management which he believes U.S. firms must
follow if they desire to adopt TQM. His 14 principles are:
1. Create constancy of purpose toward improvement of
product and service, with the aim to become competitive
and stay in business, and to provide jobs.
2. Adopt the new philosophy. We are in a new economic age.
Western management must awaken to the challenge, must
learn their responsibilities, and take on leadership for
change.
3. Cease dependence on mass inspection to achieve quality.
Eliminate the need for inspection on a mass basis by
building quality into the product in the first place.
4. End the practice of awarding business on the basis of
price tag. Instead, minimize total cost. Move toward
a single supplier for any one item, on a long-term
relationship of loyalty and trust.
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5. Improve constantly and forever the system of production
and service, to improve quality and productivity, and
thus constantly decrease costs.
6. Institute training on the job.
7. Institute leadership (see Point 12). The aim of super-
vision should be to help people and machines and gadgets
to do a better job. Supervision of management is in
need of overhaul, as well as supervision of production
workers.
8. Drive out fear, so that everyone may work effectively
for the company.
9. Break down barriers between departments. People in
research, design, sales, and production must work as a
team, to foresee problems of production and in use that
may be encountered with the product or service.
10. Eliminate slogans, exhortations, and targets for the
work force asking for zero defects and new levels of
productivity. Such exhortations only create adversarial
relationships, as the bulk of the causes of low quality
and low productivity belong to the system and thus lie
beyond the power of the work force.
11. Eliminate work standards (quotas) on the factory floor.
Substitute leadership. Eliminate management by




Remove barriers that rob the hourly worker of his right
to pride of workmanship. The responsibility of super
visors must be changed from sheer numbers to quality.
Remove barriers that rob people in management and in
engineering of their right to pride of workmanship.
This means, inter alia, abolishment of the annual or
merit rating and of management by objective.
13. Institute a vigorous program of education and self-
improvement.
14. Put everybody in the company to work to accomplish the
transformation. The transformation is everybody's job.
[Ref. 20:pp. 23-24]
Although all 14 points are interrelated, two have the
greatest implications for changing traditional procurement
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practices. These are number 3, "Cease dependence on mass
inspection" and number 4, "End the practice of awarding
business on the basis of price tag." Therefore, the
discussion in this section will focus on how these two
principles should be implemented.
The push to do away with mass inspection is based on
the theory that inspection is ineffective in ensuring quality.
This is true for two reasons. First, inspection occurs too
late in the process. If quality has not been built in during
production, it cannot be inspected in [Ref. 20:pp. 28-29].
Inspection can only separate good items from bad. Second,
even if 100 percent inspection is employed to separate good
from bad, some defective material will slip through. One
hundred percent inspection is unreliable because inspectors
are human and make errors, no matter how conscientious,
because of boredom and fatigue. [Ref. 20:p. 29] In addition
to being ineffective, mass inspection is very expensive.
First, it is very labor intensive, so it requires the
employment of many inspectors. Second, the items that fail
inspection are either discarded or reworked. The first
alternative wastes the costs of material and production used
to make the item. The second alternative wastes the
additional material and man hours employed in reworking the
item. These are all resources that could be better employed
elsewhere.
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In place of mass inspection, Statistical Process
Control (SPC) should be employed. SPC is a method to build
quality into a product during production. It is a tool to be
used by management to identify the reasons a product is not
produced with consistency. Management charts a process,
perhaps one segment of production, to see the fluctuations in
the output of the process. If the process exhibits more than
simple random variation, it is not in statistical control.
This means that local sources of trouble are affecting the
process. [Ref. 21:p. 5] Examples of local problems are
differences in materials used in production, readjustment of
machinery at the beginning of each shift, and use of different
procedures on each shift. These local problems must be
eliminated to bring the process into statistical control.
Only when the process is in control, can improvements be made
effectively. This is because if the process is not in
control, management will not be able to observe the affects of
changes made to it. [Ref. 21 :p. 5] Once the process is in
control, changes made to it will shift the entire control
chart in either a favorable or unfavorable direction, giving
management feedback about its innovations. Management can now
follow the Plan, Do, Check, Act (PDCA) cycle. First, data are
analyzed to determine what change might improve the process.
Second, management tests the idea by putting it into practice.
Third, the control charts are monitored to determine the
affect (favorable or unfavorable) of the change. Finally,
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based on the feedback from the third step, the change is
either implemented permanently or discarded. The PDCA cycle
is then begun again. The result is continuous improvement of
the process in smaller and smaller increments.
The key to employing sampling inspections and SPC in
place of mass inspection is the determination of which
characteristics to monitor and which inspection method to use.
Dr. Ishikawa explains that it is important to inspect quality
characteristics that are unstable, thus causing defects, as
well as vital characteristics that affect the life of a
product [Ref. 22]. These inspections are not performed after
the product is complete; they are conducted by the worker
during the production process. In addition, only a sample of
the items produced are inspected to either determine whether
the process is in control or to be sure that the process
remains in control. Because only a small sample of items are
inspected, inspectors can do the job properly. [Ref. 20: pp.
29-30] Dr. Ishikawa further explains that the goal of SPC
should be a product with 100 per cent acceptable quality. SPC
makes this goal feasible. [Ref. 22:pp. 117-118] Mass
inspection, on the other hand, is guaranteed to result in some
percentage of failures.
The second principle that applies directly to
procurement is number 4, "End the practice of awarding
business on the basis of price tag." What this principle
means is that when purchasing material, an organization should
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consider the lowest total cost of the item rather than the
lowest initial cost [Ref. 23]. The organization must have
long term goals. Buyers have a new job. They have
traditionally sought lower and lower prices for material with
little or no concern for quality or service. [Ref. 21:p. 25]
It is difficult to select a contractor with a higher initial
price since it can be very subjective when defending the
selection during an award protest. Now buyers must
concentrate on quality because, as Dr. Deming states:
Price has no meaning without a measure of the quality being
purchased. Without adequate measures of quality, business
drifts to the lowest bidder, low quality and high cost being
the inevitable result. American industry and the U.S.
Government, civil and military, are being rooked by rules
that award business to the lowest bidder. [Ref. 23 :p. 23]
In order to ensure receipt of quality goods and
services, an organization must do two things. First, it must
require that its suppliers practice TQM. Second, it must
reduce the number of suppliers it deals with and seek long-
term relationships with these suppliers.
To verify that a supplier practices TQM, an
organization should require the supplier to provide
statistical evidence of quality. This means supplying the
buying organization with control charts and proof that the
supplier is working on changing its management style to
conform with Deming's principles. [Ref. 21:p. 113] The
buying organization must be sure that the control charts
provided represent the proper inspection technique taken at
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the critical points in the production process using the
correct sample size. This requires a close relationship
between the buying activity and the company supplying the
material. The activity buying material must be sure that the
supplier is capable of producing a quality product before the
item is produced. In Dr. Deming's words, "The customer that
waits for delivery of material to learn what he has bought
will take what he gets." [Ref. 20:pp. 40-41] This concept
opens a new world of responsibilities to the contract
administration activities within DOD. It suggests that their
traditional role inspecting the quality of material after it
has been produced must change. Instead, they would be
expected to participate with the contractor in verifying the
quality of his production processes before and during
production of required material.
The concentration on long-term goals and close buyer-
supplier relationship requires a long-term relationship with
a small number of suppliers. This is in direct conflict with
the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 and a concept that
DOD must deal with to successfully implement a TQM philosophy.
The buying activity's goal is still to purchase material of
high quality at the least cost. However, the buying activity
must also devote resources to assist the vendor in employing
TQM if it is to succeed. Therefore, as the number of
suppliers an activity deals with increases, the number of
resources devoted to ensuring a TQM philosophy also increases.
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Even after the activity is working with suppliers dedicated to
TQM and is receiving high quality material, if this material
is supplied by two different vendors, there will be
differences. These differences will surface when the material
is placed into the production process. [Ref. 20:p. 35] For
these reasons. Dr. Deming encourages organizations to reduce
their suppliers for a given end item to one [Ref. 20, p. 23].
Ishikawa believes, however, that an organization should
maintain at least two suppliers for a given product in case
one firm is unable to supply the item [Ref. 24].
A supplier needs the promise of a long-term contract
to make it cost effective for him to institute TQM and
concentrate on continuously improving his production process
[Ref. 21:p. 115]. Without some guarantee of continued
business, he will not be willing to invest the resources
necessary to bring his processes into control and then improve
upon them. DOD must seriously consider the awarding of multi-
year contracts (two to five years) or contracts with optional
years to assure a contractor that DOD is supporting a basic
TQM mandate. Contractors are currently forced to concentrate
on making a profit in the short term since DOD is focused on
the short term. If, however, a long-term relationship can be
developed, both customer and supplier will benefit. The
customer will receive high quality material at lower costs.
The supplier will no longer need to employ resources in
storing and reworking defective material. [Ref. 21:p. 115]
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2 . TOM Implementation—POD
The application of TQM within the Federal Government
began in 1986 when President Reagan signed Executive Order
12552. The goal of this Executive Order is to significantly
improve the productivity of the Federal Government by 1992
through employment of TQM. [Ref. 25] In 1988, DOD initiated
its TQM program, issuing the Total Quality Management Master
Plan in August of that year.
The strategy of the Master Plan "aims at achieving one
broad, unending objective: continuous improvement of products
and services." [Ref. 26] In order to achieve this objective,
the plan includes goals for the short term (one year)
,
mid
term (three years) , and long term (seven years) . These goals
cover a broad range of DOD tasks. They state, however, that
the acquisition community will be the first to implement TQM
and that others will follow in approximately three years [Ref.
26:p. 3]. Since the acquisition community is leading TQM
implementation and this thesis will concentrate its discussion
of TQM in the areas relating to RYG, discussion of the Master
Plan will be limited to procurement and Government-industry
relationships
.
In the short term, two of the seven goals directly
impact procurement. The first of the two is to "Begin
enlisting Defense industry commitment." This goal intends to
begin TQM implementation by using programs already in
existence within DOD. These programs are to be used to
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communicate to industry DOD's desire for continuous process
improvement. [Ref. 26 :p. 10] The second applicable goal is
to "Develop and implement recognition and reward system based
on TQM goals and behaviors." This goal discusses the need to
revise existing performance incentives to encourage and reward
continuous improvement efforts. [Ref. 26 :p. 10]
One of the nine mid-term goals applies directly to
procurement: "Implementation commitment by major Defense
contractors, with 'critical mass' achieved in at least the top
2 5 contractors." This goal intends to result in a commitment
from the top 2 5 Defense contractors to independently implement
continuous process improvement programs. These 2 5 contractors
receive contracts valuing more than 50 percent of DOD's total
acquisition expenditures, and they receive most of DOD major
system contracts. This commitment is expected to involve the
training of senior leadership within these firms in TQM and
their active involvement in continuous improvement efforts.
[Ref. 16:p. 6]
In the long term, one of the four goals of the Master
Plan impacts upon procurement: "Widespread Defense industry
implementation of continuous process improvement."
Implementation of this goal involves employment of TQM by all
DOD prime and subcontractors. Its achievement requires three
things of DOD. First, DOD must encourage and assist
contractors in their implementation of continuous process
improvement. Second, DOD is expected to develop criteria to
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evaluate contractor commitment to continuous improvement.
Finally, the degree and success of contractor process
improvement efforts are to be included in source selection
strategies. [Ref. 26:p. 4] Within this goal, the Master Plan
states, "The intent of continuous process improvement efforts
is to recognize and reward dedication and adherence to the
improvement process, and not restrict reward to attaining a
specific standard of performance." [Ref. 16:p. 4]
E . SUMMARY
This chapter briefly described three DOD contractor
quality programs. The programs described were the Air Force
CPARS , NAC Indianapolis Blue Ribbon Contractor program, and
DOD TQM initiative. The procedures associated with each
program have been provided as background information to
support the next chapter. The chapter that follows will
discuss the merits and shortcomings of the three programs and
their relationship to RYG.
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IV. A COMPARISON OF RED YELLOW GREEN AND OTHER
CONTRACTOR QUALITY INITIATIVES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will use the background information provided
in Chapter III to analyze the Red Yellow Green (RYG) program
relative to the other three programs described—the Contractor
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) , the Blue
Ribbon Contractor program, and the Total Quality Management
(TQM) initiative. The purpose of the analysis is to determine
whether RYG should co-exist with these other initiatives or if
it should replace or be replaced by any one of them.
The assessment will be organized in the same way as the
background information presented in Chapter III. First, RYG
will be compared to CPARS. Next, RYG will be evaluated
relative to Naval Avionics Center (NAC) Indianapolis' Blue
Ribbon Contractor program. Finally, RYG will be assessed for
its compatibility with the Department of Defense (DOD) TQM
initiative.
B. CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORTING SYSTEM
The CPARS devised by the Air Force is intended for use in
source selections for major systems contracts. Therefore, the
threshold for employment of CPARS is set at $5 million and the
number of contractors included in the program has been limited
to 84. The Air Force had two major reasons for setting these
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limits. The first involves maintenance of the Contractor
Performance Assessment Reports (CPARs) . The second involves
the nature of the information reported in the CPARs and,
therefore, the way in which this information must be used in
the source selection process. These two factors will be
discussed in detail in the following paragraphs.
Maintenance of CPARs requires many resources. First, it
involves the time invested by the program manager to prepare
the report. Although the reports are supposed to be based on
facts, they are not merely collections of data. They are
written, subjective assessments of the contractor's perfor-
mance and, therefore, require some effort on the part of the
program manager. The second factor concerning maintenance of
CPARs involves the efforts of those who verify the information
contained in the reports, ensure that the reports are current,
and physically store the reports. Since the CPARs are
expected to be used in future source selections, the Air Force
carefully verifies the information contained in the reports to
ensure that it is compatible with past trends and other CPARs
filed on the same contractor. When an activity uses CPARs in
source selection, the currency of the information is checked.
If a more current CPAR is desired, the procuring activity
contacts the program office and requests more up-to-date
information. In addition, since the system is not yet
automated, maintaining hard copy files of all CPARs at the six
Product Divisions within the Air Force Systems Command
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requires a tremendous clerical effort. Maintenance of the
CPARs is a very labor intensive process.
The information contained in CPARs is subjective. It is
based on facts, but much of it is still the opinion of the
program manager and members of the program office.
Additionally, because a CPAR is a written report, it is a
relatively long document. Because of its subjectivity and
length, the use of CPARs in source selection requires careful
evaluation of the information contained in the report. To
perform this evaluation, the CPARs must first be collected,
evaluated for their relevance to the procurement in question,
and assembled into an integrated report. The resulting report
is then further evaluated in conjunction with other past
performance data to determine a contractor's level of risk.
This is a relatively long process. The Air Force believes the
process is beneficial for major weapon system procurements.
However, CPARS is not used for non-major acquisitions.
The points discussed above suggest that CPARS would not be
appropriate for contracting operations at field activities for
three reasons.
First, the investment in resources to maintain the CPARs
could not be justified by the relatively small dollar
procurements awarded by field contracting activities. The
return on investment to obtain higher quality material would




Second, in order to be effective in field contracting, the
number of contractors included in the program would have to be
greatly expanded. The contractors that compete in major
system procurements are relatively few. However, field
contracting offices deal with thousands of contractors. Even
if fewer than 100 contractors were included in the system,
field activities would find it very difficult to obtain
accurate past performance information. An expansion of CPARS
at the field level to accommodate such a large number of
contractors would be an impossible undertaking.
Finally, even if CPARS were expanded, field contracting
offices would have neither the time nor the resources to
perform the evaluation necessary to correctly apply it to
source selection.
In summary, CPARS seems to be only appropriate for use in
the procurement of major systems. It should not be considered
for expanded use in field contracting. RYG was designed for
use by field contracting offices. Accordingly, its formula
driven assessment of past performance would not be appropriate
for use in major system procurements. The two programs were
designed to satisfy different needs in different areas of
Government contracting. Therefore, neither should be
considered as a replacement for the other.
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C. BLUE RIBBON CONTRACTOR PROGRAM
The Blue Ribbon Contractor program at NAC Indianapolis has
five unique features. First, it is an automated system
created by NAC using data collected by NAC. Second, the
criteria used to define a Blue Ribbon contractor and the
programs included in the program were chosen to focus
attention on the critical and problem materials procured by
NAC. Third, contractors must apply for Blue Ribbon status to
be included in the program, and NAC performs the analysis to
determine whether these contractors qualify for the benefits
of the program. Fourth, the program concentrates on
commodities important to NAC ' s mission, and a contractor must
make a delivery to NAC at least once each year to be included
in the program. Therefore, the contractors designated as Blue
Ribbon will generally be the contractors NAC deals with on a
regular basis. Fifth, use of the program in source selection
requires judgment. Unlike RYG, it is not a formula-driven
program. The decision to award to a Blue Ribbon contractor
over a lower-priced offeror (not included in the program)
requires an assessment by both contracting and quality
assurance personnel. Therefore, the two groups must
communicate with each other to use the program effectively.
Like RYG, the Blue Ribbon Contractor program is ap-
propriate for use in field contracting. However, a Blue
Ribbon program requires that an activity devote many more
resources than does RYG. First, the activity would need the
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capability to automate. Second, it would have to devise the
criteria to be used in designating Blue Ribbon contractors.
NAC chose delivery, but other commands might be more
interested in quality or reliability. Third, it would have to
decide which commodities are important enough to its mission
to justify inclusion in the program. Fourth, it would need to
devote resources to the program to evaluate applicants and
maintain the Blue Ribbon Contractor list. Finally, the
contracting and quality assurance personnel in the command
would have to be willing and able to work together to
implement the program.
Some commands would be unable to take the five steps
discussed in the previous paragraph. They might lack the
automation necessary to implement the program. Or,
contracting personnel might be physically located away from
quality assurance personnel. This would be the case for a
Navy Regional Contracting Center procuring goods and services
for many of its Navy field activities. In either case,
implementation of a Blue Ribbon Contractor program would be
impractical. Therefore, a Blue Ribbon program does not seem
to be a viable option for every field contracting activity.
The question then is whether RYG and Blue Ribbon
Contractor programs could co-exist at activities capable of
implementing both programs. This researcher believes the
answer to that question is yes—the programs are compatible
and can enhance each other. If used together, the Blue Ribbon
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program would be used when procuring goods and services that
the command considers critical to the performance of its
mission. The Blue Ribbon program would allow the command to
concentrate its attention on those parameters that it
considers important. RYG could be used for all other procure-
ments. By definition, RYG procurements would be for less
critical and less frequently purchased materials. These items
would not justify the resources needed to apply the Blue
Ribbon program. In addition, the command may not have been
able to generate enough local data on critical items to assess
contractor past performance. RYG would allow the command to
consider past performance in source selection while employing
a very simple system.
Selected field activities could benefit from using both
RYG and a tailored Blue Ribbon Contractor program. The most
likely evolution would be to first implement RYG since it is
less complex. Use of RYG should help personnel involved in
the source selection process become comfortable with using an
automated system. In addition, implementation of RYG should
force contracting and quality assurance personnel to work
together. RYG requires quality assurance personnel to use
past performance to evaluate offerors and determine the
quality assurance actions required of each. They must then
provide this assessment to contracting. Therefore, RYG
involves quality assurance more deeply in the source
evaluation process. Both will help pave the way for
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introduction of a Blue Ribbon Contractor program concentrating
attention on the area of the command's specialization. [Ref.
27]
D. TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT
The discussion in this section will focus on whether RYG
furthers the goals of TQM. The purpose of this discussion is
to evaluate whether RYG is consistent with DOD ' s TQM
initiative or whether RYG hinders this initiative. This
section will first consider RYG ' s conformance to the general
goals of TQM as outlined in Chapter III.
.
Second, it will
relate RYG to the goals in the DOD TQM Master Plan.
1. TOM and RYG—General
Two of Dr. Deming's 14 principles were determined to
directly impact the Government procurement process and,
therefore, apply to the comparison of TQM and RYG. These two
principles are:
1. Number 3. "Cease dependence on mass inspection to
achieve quality. Eliminate the need for inspection on
a mass basis by building quality into the product in the
first place." [Ref. 20:p. 23]
2. Number 4. "End the practice of awarding business on the
basis of price tag. Instead, minimize total cost. Move
toward a single supplier for any one item, on a long-
term relationship of loyalty and trust." [Ref. 20 :p.
23]
The first concept addresses the requirement for contractors to
practice statistical process control (SPC) . The second
addresses the relationship between buyers and suppliers.
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Implementation of it involves considering total cost when
awarding contracts by ensuring that suppliers practice TQM.
RYG does not satisfy all of the requirements of these
two principles, nor does it require contractors to practice
all of Deming's 14 principles. It does, however, help the
Government end the practice of awarding business on the basis
of price tag by considering the total cost of a procurement
when the cost of poor quality is added to the source selection
formula. Therefore, in a limited way, RYG helps to further
the goals of TQM.
This researcher believes that a limited implementation
of TQM in field contracting is probably a more realistic
undertaking for DOD. Even the third and fourth Deming
principles will be very difficult to implement since they
require two resources that may not be available to field
contracting officers—time and personnel.
Time is required to ensure that the supplier practices
TQM. Contracting personnel would have to examine the TQM
programs of offerors in detail. They would need to ensure
that the contractors practice SPC as well as other Deming
principles. Implementation of the management principles is
more difficult and more time consuming because it involves
evaluating the firm's daily management style. Field
contracting requires the processing of many procurement
actions in a relatively short period of time. Contracting
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offices do not devote the time necessary to perforin such an
on-going evaluation.
In addition to time, personnel are required to perform
a vendor TQM assessment. As discussed in Chapter III, the
buying activity must be able to evaluate whether the supplier
is taking the correct measurements at the critical points in
production and if the sampling technique is proper. This
requires an in depth knowledge of both the production process
and statistics. Someone with technical knowledge of the item
being purchased, perhaps an engineer, would have to be a
permanent member of the evaluation team. Additionally, a
statistician would probably be needed. It is unlikely that a
contracting office would have either the number of personnel
or skill levels required for the task.
2. TOM and RYG—POD
With the exception of its short-term goals, the
segments of the DOD TQM Master Plan relating to procurement
seem to focus on procurement of major systems. This is
probably due to the dollar values involved in major system
procurements as well as the degree of management attention
focused on each program. The expected returns from using TQM
for major system acquisitions would be greater than for
smaller procurements. In addition, the time schedule of a
major system acquisition would more easily allow the
contractor evaluation required by TQM. Procurements made in
the field do not involve such high dollar values. Neither do
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they allow the degree of management attention required by-
procurement of a major system. However, in spite of the fact
that the Master Plan does not specifically address contractor
quality programs intended for field contracting, this
researcher believes that RYG can still be shown to conform to
the intent of the Master Plan.
In the short term, the Master Plan discusses enlisting
defense industry commitment to TQM by using programs already
in existence within DOD. Additionally, it hopes to employ
recognition and reward systems based on TQM goals and
behaviors. [Ref. 26 :p. 10] RYG is consistent with both these
objectives.
First, RYG employs an existing system, the Product
Deficiency Reporting and Evaluation Program (PDREP) , to
improve the quality of material received by the Navy. It
expands the application of this system to allow greater
consideration of contractor past performance in the source
selection process. Second, RYG could be used to reward
contractors who provide good quality material to the
Government. It accomplishes this by considering the cost of
poor quality when making source selection decisions. Since
proposals from contractors with good quality history are not
assessed a Technical Evaluation Adjustment, these contractors
have a competitive advantage over those with a poor quality
history.
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The Master Plan's procurement goal for the mid term
addresses only major system procurements. It involves getting
a commitment from DOD's top 2 5 contractors to implement TQM.
These contractors receive more than 50 percent of DOD's
procurement dollars and most of its major system
contracts. [Ref. 26:p. 6] This goal is not related to RYG
since RYG neither helps nor hinders its implementation.
In the long term, the Master Plan seeks employment of
TQM by all DOD prime and subcontractors [Ref. 26:p. 4]. As
discussed earlier in this section, it is difficult for field
contracting offices to require and verify employment of TQM by
the vast number of contractors dealt with at this level.
However, RYG at least allows them to consider improved
quality, which is the result of continuous process
improvement, in their source selection decisions. Therefore,
use of RYG is at least a step toward TQM implementation in
field contracting. Additionally, implementing a Blue Ribbon
Contractor program in conjunction with RYG can move field
contracting activities even closer to the goals of TQM.
As described in the Blue Ribbon Contractor Program
section of this chapter, the RYG and Blue Ribbon Contractor
programs can enhance each other. RYG is necessary for
procurement of infrequently used and non-critical materials
that do not justify a great deal of management attention. It
is also needed by commands incapable of implementing a Blue
Ribbon Contractor program. RYG focuses on the negative
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aspects of poor performance to improve quality. A Blue Ribbon
Contractor program requires more resources to implement than
does RYG and so would be used in the procurement of materials
an activity considers critical. Blue Ribbon programs focus on
the positive aspects of past performance to improve quality.
Because of its simplicity and focus on the negative,
RYG could be considered a first step toward implementing TQM
in field contracting. The program will always be needed when
a Blue Ribbon program is either unavailable or inappropriate.
Since the Blue Ribbon Contractor programs are more complex and
focus on the positive, they are a logical second step toward
implementing TQM in field contracting.
E . SUMMARY
This chapter evaluated the three DOD quality programs
described in the previous chapter—CPARS , the Blue Ribbon
Contractor program, and the TQM initiative. It compared and
contrasted these programs to RYG and discussed whether RYG
should co-exist with them. The next chapter will assess the
strengths and weaknesses of the RYG program. The analysis
will include a discussion concerning the program's ability to
withstand a protest. It will also assess the current status
of the RYG test.
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V. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF RED YELLOW GREEN
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will attempt to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of the Red Yellow Green (RYG) program. First, the
four areas of the program most open to contractor protests
will be addressed. The first area considered will be whether
RYG results in de facto debarment of Red and Yellow contrac-
tors. The second consideration is whether the Technical
Evaluation Adjustments (TEAs) could be regarded as penalties
and whether it is fair for the Government to consider costs of
quality (a basic premise of RYG) in the source selection
decision in the first place. The third to be discussed will
be whether consideration of past performance, as an evaluation
factor, constitutes a responsibility determination. The
fourth area addressed in this chapter will be the accuracy of
the data base used to rate contractors Red, Yellow, or Green.
The overall discussion will include an evaluation of the
program's ability to withstand a contractor protest.
Next, the progress of the RYG program test will be
examined. This discussion will first involve an assessment of
test implementation at each of the five test activities. It
will then provide data documenting the results of the test to
date and discuss the significance of these data.
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B. PROTEST ISSUES
1 . De Facto Debarment
The discussion concerning de facto debarment will
center around whether designating a contractor as Red or
Yellow has the same effect as debarment. The effect of
debarment as described in the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) is:
(a) Debarred or suspended contractors are excluded from
receiving contracts, and agencies shall not solicit offers
from, award contracts to, or consent to subcontracts with
these contractors, unless the acquiring agency's head or a
designee determines that there is a compelling reason for
such action.... [Ref. 28]
Cibinic and Nash provide a similar description of the effect
of debarment:
The second broad sanction is debarment of the contractor
or its employees from taking any Government contracts for a
stated period of time. ... Debarment precludes contracts with
any agency of the federal government for a period of up to
three years.... [Ref. 29]
Based on the above definition, it is clear that debarment of
contractors excludes them from competing for any Government
contract. This means that the Government must avoid both
soliciting offers from and awarding contracts to debarred
contractors.
Application of the RYG test procedures neither stops
the Government from soliciting offers from nor awarding
contracts to Red and Yellow contractors [Ref. 30]. It merely
allows the Government to consider the costs it expects to
incur based on the quality of material it is most likely to
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receive from an offeror. If, after considering the costs
related to additional quality assurance requirements, a Red or
Yellow contractor is the lowest-priced responsible offeror,
the Red or Yellow contractor will be awarded the contract.
Since the Government will be soliciting proposals
from, and awarding contracts to. Red and Yellow contractors,
application of the RYG test procedures is not considered a de
facto debarment in the analysis of the researcher. It is
expected that the RYG program will be able to withstand any
protest in this area.
2. Use of TEAS
The second area for potential protest is the use of
TEAS. The propriety of using TEAs will be considered first
by discussing whether TEAs could be considered penalties and,
therefore, unenforceable, and second by discussing whether it
is fair for the Government to consider costs of quality when
evaluating proposals. In order to assess the reasonableness
of the values assigned as TEAs, the researcher considered
precedent associated with the reasonableness of liquidated
damages amounts.
Regulations and precedent applying to liquidated
damages were used to determine whether the TEAs (as calculated
in the RYG test procedures) could be considered penalties.
The FAR states that "liquidated damages fixed without any
reference to probable actual damages may be held to be a
penalty, and therefore unenforceable. " [Ref. 28:para. 12.202]
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Based on this regulation, the question then becomes whether
the TEAS are related to actual costs that the Government would
expect to incur when forced to carry out additional quality
assurance requirements.
Cibinic and Nash state, "The Government contract rule
is that the reasonableness of the forecast of liquidated
damages is evaluated by looking at the situation at the time
the contract is made...." [Ref. 29: p. 802] They further
explain that even liquidated damages calculated at a fixed
rate of dollars per day have been upheld by the courts because
they are considered to cover the Government's administrative
expenses, "i.e., inspection, superintendence or engineering
costs, which the Government will incur if a delay is
encountered." [Ref. 29: p. 803] In the case of Young
Associates, Inc. v. United States, 200 Ct. CI. 438,471 F.2d
618 (1973) the court stated:
The answer is, we think, that the regulation does not
require a liquidated-damage schedule to be tailor made for
each individual contract. It is enough if the amount
stipulated is reasonable for the particular agreement at the
time it is made. [Ref. 29:p. 804]
In summary, amounts of liquidated damages are
considered reasonable if they are a fair estimate (calculated
when the contract is made) of the administrative costs the
Government would expect to incur during a delay. Further, the
estimate need not be tailored to each contract. Based on
this, amounts of TEAs should be considered reasonable if they
are truly a fair estimate of the administrative costs the
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Government expects to incur because a contractor has poor
quality history.
The TEAS furnished as examples in Chapter II and
Appendix D were calculated using Navy Material Quality
Assessment Office (NMQAO) historical data. These data include
labor hours required for the quality assurance actions, labor
rates, and costs of testing. [Ref. 2] They are, however,
provided only as examples. Each test activity has used these
examples and their own quality assurance history and labor
rates to calculate local TEAs. Therefore, the TEAs assessed
in the test of RYG are tailored to the expected costs of each
activity. Since the TEAs represent a fair estimate of the
costs each activity expects to incur because of increased
quality assurance requirements (calculated at the time of
contract award) , this researcher believes that they would be
considered reasonable in the event of a protest. In addition,
since the TEAs assessed correspond to the specific quality
assurance actions required in the contract, they could be con-
sidered to be tailored to each contract. Based on the case
law concerning liquidated damages, a tailored assessment might
not be necessary, however, it probably strengthens the
argument justifying the reasonableness of assigned TEAs.
The second consideration in the assessment of the
propriety of using TEAs is whether it is fair for the
Government to consider the costs of additional quality
assurance requirements in source selection. There is
63
precedent for considering costs similar to TEAs in the source
selection decision. Specifically, the FAR discusses the
consideration of first article test and transportation costs
in the source selection process.
Regarding first article testing, the FAR states,
"Solicitations containing a testing and approval requirement
shall ... include, when the Government is responsible for first
article testing, the Government's estimated testing costs as
a factor for use in evaluating offers...." [Ref. 28: para.
9.306] In addition, the FAR requires that the solicitations
"inform offerors that the requirement may be waived when
supplies identical or similar to those called for have
previously been delivered by the offeror and accepted by the
Government...." [Ref. 28: para. 9.306] These two statements
suggest that not only should the Government consider the costs
of testing in the source selection decision, but that the
decision concerning the requirement of first article testing
should be based on the performance history of the offerors.
Both support the use of TEAs when evaluating past performance.
Regarding transportation costs, the FAR states,
"Solicitations, when appropriate, shall specify that offers
may be f.o.b. origin, f.o.b. destination, or both; and that
they will be evaluated on the basis of the lowest overall cost
to the Government." [Ref. 28:para. 47.305-2] The FAR further
states, "When evaluating offers, contracting officers shall
consider transportation and transportation-related
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costs..." [Ref. 28:para. 47.306] These statements strengthen
the argument that it is fair for the Government to use TEAs
based on differences in the costs it will incur because of
quality differences.
3 . Use of Responsibility-Related Factors
The argument against use of past performance as a
factor in source evaluation states that since past performance
is one of seven responsibility factors listed in the FAR, its
use in source evaluation constitutes a responsibility
determination [Ref. 28:para. 9.104-1]. In the case of small
businesses, a determination of non-responsibility must be
referred to the cognizant Small Business Administration (SBA)
Regional Office [Ref. 28:para. 19.602-1]. Therefore, if use
of past performance in source evaluation were considered to
constitute responsibility determination, any negative impact
the RYG test procedures had on small business would have to be
referred to the SBA. Failure to comply with FAR Part 19.602-
1 would violate statute and regulation. In order to determine
whether the responsibility argument is valid, several
pertinent General Accounting Office (GAO) protest decisions
have been examined. The cases and their implications are
summarized below.
Three of the cases evaluated indicate that
responsibility factors may be used in source evaluation
provided that negotiated procurement practices are used, and
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the selecting activity uses these factors to make a
comparative evaluation of offerors.
In the matter of B & W Service Industries, Inc. (B &
W)
,
B & W contended that responsibility factors (i.e., company
experience, past performance, and the experience of key
personnel) should not have been used in the Department of
Housing and Urban Development's evaluation of their proposal.
GAO denied the protest. [Ref. 31] In its decision, GAO
stated:
Contracting officers evaluate prospective contractors to
determine their responsibility, that is, their capability to
perform the work.... COG (Certificate of Competency)
referrals to SBA are only required where contracting
officers find small businesses to be nonresponsible. In
this case, the agency did not find the protester
nonresponsible, but considered its proposal to be weak under
some evaluation factors listed in the solicitation.
With regard to these factors, it is not improper in a
negotiated procurement to include traditional responsibility
factors among the technical evaluation criteria. .. .As long
as the factors are limited to areas which, when evaluated
comparatively, can provide an appropriate basis for a
selection that will be in the government's best interest,
COG procedures do not apply to a technical proposal
deficient in those areas. [Ref. 31]
In the case of Utah Geophysical Inc. (UGI)
,
UGI
contended that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) failed
to refer a non-responsibility determination to the SBA. They
argued that because source evaluation included responsibility
factors (i.e., experience and level of effort for key
personnel assigned to the project), the NRG ' s finding that
their proposal was unacceptable constituted a determination of
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non-responsibility. [Ref. 32] GAO denied the protest and
stated in its decision:
Matters which are normally considered in responsibility
determinations may properly be considered in evaluation of
proposals when negotiation procedures are used and agency
makes relative assessment of competing offerors' ability to
meet contract requirements. [Ref. 32]
In the matter of Electrospace Systems, Inc. (ESI), ESI
protested the Army's use of offerors' experience in source
evaluation. This evaluation criterion impacted ESI's
exclusion from the competitive range. They argued that use of
responsibility-related factors in source evaluation violated
the SBA's statutory authority to certify the responsibility of
small businesses. [Ref. 33] In its decision, GAO cites a
previous case involving SBD Computer Services Corporation, B-
186950, December 21, 1976, 76-2 CPD 511. In its 1976
decision, GAO stated:
In many other cases, we have recognized that contracting
agencies may properly utilize evaluation factors which
include experience and other areas that would otherwise be
encompassed by offeror responsibility determinations when
the needs of those agencies warrant a comparative evaluation
of those areas. [Ref. 33]
In its decision to deny ESI's protest, GAO stated:
Since neither 10 U.S.C. 2304(g) nor applicable regulation in
any way restrict the "other factors" that may be used by
agencies in selecting the proposal having the greatest value
to the Government, we have not prohibited procuring agencies
from using responsibility-related factors in making relative
assessments of the merits of competing proposals. [Ref. 33]
The cases cited above all support use of
responsibility factors in source evaluation. However, care
must be exercised to ensure that, if such factors are used.
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the Government makes a comparative evaluation of offerors, not
a pass/fail determination. If a responsibility factor is used
to ascertain the technical acceptability of a proposal, its
use will be considered to constitute a responsibility
determination. Two cases providing examples of this
distinction are described below.
In the case of Sanford and Sons Company (Sanford)
,
Sanford protested the Army Corps of Engineers* determination
that their proposal was technically unacceptable. The request
for proposals (RFP) stated that the contract would be awarded
to the lowest-priced, technically-qualified offeror. Two of
the six criteria for source evaluation detailed in the RFP
were: (1) organization and administration; and (2)
satisfactory performance record. The Army found Sanford 's
proposal to be technically unacceptable in both organization
and administration and past performance. Both of these areas
are considered responsibility factors. GAO sustained the
protest. [Ref. 34] In its decision GAO stated:
We have cautioned that an agency may not find that a small
business is nonresponsible under the guise of a relative
assessment of responsibility factors and thus avoid
referring the matter to the Small Business Administration.
[Ref. 34]
The decision further states:
Although an agency may use traditional responsibility
factors, like prior performance, as technical evaluation
factors where its needs warrant a comparative evaluation of
proposals, an agency's rejection of a small business firm's
offer as unacceptable under such factors was improper where
the agency's decision did not reflect a relative assessment
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of the offer but instead effectively constituted a finding
of nonresponsibility . [Ref. 34]
In the matter of Siems International Electron
Microscope Service (Siems) , Siems protested the cancellation
of a RFP by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) . NIH had
determined that Siems was non-responsible under the RFP, but
Siems was subsequently issued a Certificate of Competency by
the SBA. NIH stated that the solicitation was cancelled
because the specification in the RFP was inadequate, not
whether or not Siems was responsible. NIH determined,
therefore, that the requirement should be resolicited. Under
the new RFP, Siems proposal was determined to be technically
unacceptable. This determination was based on a
responsibility factor—contractor capacity. [Ref. 35] GAO
sustained the protest, stating:
Where offerors were not required to submit technical
proposals to service electron microscopes but only to offer
to conform to the best practices of the industry, and the
factors making up the technical criteria were evaluation of
capacity factors, the determination an offeror was
technically unacceptable amounted, in essence, to a
determination of nonresponsibility for reasons of capacity
that required a referral to the Small Business
Administration. . . . [Ref. 35]
The conclusion that can be drawn after examination of
the above five cases is that responsibility factors may be
used in source evaluation, but that activities must be careful
not to use such factors to determine the technical
acceptability of a proposal. If implemented as written, the
RYG test procedures do not use past performance to determine
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technical acceptability. It will be used, however, to better
determine the true cost to the Government of doing business
with each offeror. In fact, the test procedures specifically
state that a contractor's status under the test is not to be
used as a substitute for the requirement to make a
responsibility determination [Ref. l:encl. (1), p. 4]. The
test activities, however, must exercise care in administering
the RYG procedures to ensure that they do not use a
contractor's past performance to judge his technical
acceptability.
In summary, the Government faces a risk that GAO may
sustain a protest arguing that use of the RYG test procedures
constitutes a responsibility determination. However, if the
test procedures are implemented as intended, the Office of
General Council (OGC) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics) (ASN(S&L)) believes
that the Government has a good argument to support its case
that use of past performance under the RYG test constitutes a
comparative evaluation of offerors, not a responsibility
determination [Ref. 30].
4 . Accuracy of the Data Base
The validity of the Contractor Evaluation System (CES)
data base presents the greatest potential for protest since
they are the basis of categorizing contractors as Red, Yellow,
or Green. The data are maintained very well by the Naval
Material Quality Assessment Office (NMQAO) . Therefore, the
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CES is an accurate portrayal of the data received by NMQAO
from the sources described in Chapter II. [Ref. 36] Problems
will occur, however, if the data are inaccurate when they are
submitted to NMQAO. Culpability (Government or contractor)
for rejects and deficiencies is assigned before the data are
submitted to NMQAO. Because of the volume of data received,
it would be impossible for NMQAO to verify each item [Ref.
36]. If an activity submits inaccurate data, a contractor
could be mistakenly classified Red or Yellow. If a contractor
were to lose a contract because of an incorrect
classification, he would have a strong argument to support
filing a protest.
Two issues arise in evaluating the probability that
the RYG test procedures will survive a protest based on
inaccurate data. First, the current accuracy of the data base
must be considered. Prior to NMQAO classifying contractors
Red, Yellow, or Green, letters were mailed to all Red and
Yellow contractors informing them of their status and the
reasons for the classification. With each monthly update of
the data base, contractors are notified of any change in their
status under the test. Contractors were advised to contact
NMQAO if they had any questions about the program or their
color classification. NMQAO mailed 2037 notification letters
and has received 247 oral and written responses to the
classifications assigned. Thirteen of these responses
resulted in changes to the data base. In three cases, data
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corrections resulted in a change of color classification.
[Ref. 37] Thirteen corrections out of 2037 would suggest a
0.56 percent error rate. However, such an assumption would be
invalid since only a small percentage of the contractors
notified provided a response.
The only way to estimate the accuracy of the data base
is to draw a representative sample of contractors and verify
the data leading to their color classification. Such an
undertaking would require more resources than are currently
available to NMQAO. Additionally, even if such an evaluation
were to be made, there is no yardstick available to determine
what would be an acceptable level of accuracy. [Ref. 36]
Therefore, the validity and acceptable accuracy level of the
data base can only be determined during the test.
One of the benefits of gaining approval from the
Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council for the one-year test
of the RYG program is that GAO has traditionally declined to
hear protests on other test programs [Ref. 38]. It is hoped
that a test period free of protests will allow NMQAO to assess
the validity of the data and resolve inaccurate data, and
hopefully expand the program to all of DOD.
The second issue pertaining to the accuracy of the
data base concerns the notification letters sent to
contractors informing them of their status in the program.
These letters inform contractors of their current color
classification based on documented performance history. In
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the opinion of Ms. Sandra Desbrow-Jensen of the OGC at
ASN(S&L) , if a contractor does not respond within a reasonable
period to correct errors in the data base, he will be estopped
from later protesting the validity of the data base [Ref. 30].
If GAO supports this position, the contractor notification
letters should help eliminate protests based on the accuracy
of the data.
C. PROGRESS OF RYG TEST
1. Implementation
In order to assess the progress of the RYG program
implementation, the researcher conducted interviews with
personnel at each of the five test activities. The purpose of
the interviews was to gain the perspective of both contracting
and quality assurance personnel involved in RYG
implementation. Therefore, interviews were conducted with
individuals from both areas at each activity.
The following paragraphs summarize the comments
received during the interviews. The perspective of
contracting personnel are presented first, followed by
comments from the quality assurance community. Finally, the
researcher discusses similarities and differences between
these comments and their implications.
a. Contracting
(1) Naval Supply Center (NSC) Pensacola . The
researcher interviewed CDR Walsh, Contracting Officer at NSC
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Pensacola when the RYG implementation began. He explained
that the NSC had begun RYG implementation with a small number
of Federal Supply Classes (FSCs) . The Contracting Department
chose 2 FSCs from a list given to them by the Naval Aviation
Depot (NADEP) Pensacola. Initially, they have applied the RYG
test procedures to ten of the 20 FSCs and small purchases.
They intend to later expand the program to all 2 FSCs and
major procurements. The test has not generated a great deal
of activity to date, but CDR Walsh anticipates a greater
impact when the program is expanded. [Ref. 39]
The test procedures have not yet resulted in
significant extra work. Quality assurance personnel at the
NADEP have helped absorb some of the extra burden. The NSC
has not received much negative feedback from contractors.
[Ref. 39]
CDR Walsh expressed concern about the
accuracy of the data base used for the RYG test.
Additionally, he worries about the affect the program will
have on distributors who are also small businesses. Although
theoretically distributors should be responsible for the
quality of material they sell, small businesses may not have
the capability to properly test their stock. He fears that
the RYG program may hurt these small businesses. [Ref. 39]
(2) NSC Charleston . Mrs. Davidson, Deputy
Director, Purchase Division, Regional Contracting Department,
NSC Charleston, was interviewed to gain the perspective of
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contracting personnel at the other NSC involved in the RYG
test. She explained that the RYG test procedures are being
applied to procurements of Controlled Industrial Material
(CIM) for the Charleston Naval Shipyard. All solicitations
for CIM are done in writing, including small purchases, so it
takes 30 days to receive proposals. As a result, no awards
have yet been made using the RYG test procedures. [Ref. 40]
Mrs. Davidson believes that evaluation of
proposals using the test procedures will involve extra work
for contracting personnel. However, since no evaluations have
yet been performed, she does not know how burdensome this
extra requirement will be. She thinks the program will be
beneficial because it will allow the NSC to resolve quality
problems before contract award; therefore, she expects RYG to
reduce contract administration activities. [Ref. 40]
Mrs. Davidson expressed concern that
application of the RYG procedures would have a negative impact
on the department's Productive Unit Resourcing System (PURS)
statistics because it adds work before contract award which
will not be given appropriate credit. Time savings are not
realized until the contract administration phase of the
procurement process. Therefore, although she anticipates
benefits from the program, she wonders whether they will
outweigh the program's negative impacts. [Ref. 40]
(3) Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) . The
researcher interviewed Mr. Minahan, Director of the Hull,
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Mechanical, and Electrical Contracting Department, SPCC. He
explained that SPCC has applied the RYG test procedures to
five FSCs. So far, his department has not been burdened with
much extra work. [Ref. 41]
Mr. Minahan indicated that the procurements
included in the RYG test at SPCC involve fairly high dollar
values. As a result, he does not believe the application of
TEAS will have much impact on their source selection
decisions. He thinks the TEAs may have a greater effect at
other activities making smaller dollar value procurements.
[Ref. 41]
(4) Naval Air and Enqineerincr Center (NAEC) . Mr.
Fackenthal, Supervisory Contract Specialist at NAEC Lakehurst,
was interviewed. He explained that NAEC is applying the RYG
small purchase method as outlined in the test procedures.
However, they requested and received approval to follow the
Fixed Price-Greatest Value procedures instead of the
procedures using TEAs for their major procurements. NAEC made
this request after reviewing a sample of the contractors they
have done business with during the last two years. Their
review indicated that only ten percent of the contractors in
the sample were in the CES data base. NAEC attributes this to
the nature of their procurements. They make very few
repetitive buys. Many of their procurements have production
lead times of up to one year. Therefore, the performance
history generated is too old to classify a contractor as Red,
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Yellow, or Green. NAEC believes that the more subjective
Fixed Price-Greatest Value procedures will better suit their
procurements. [Ref. 42]
Mr. Fackenthal indicated that it is difficult
to assess the results of the program yet because they only
began using the small purchase procedures in October 1989 and
have not yet made a contract award using the major purchase
procedures. However, he stated that all the comments he has
received about the program, including those from contractors,
have been positive. He indicated that the contracting
personnel at NAEC are positive about the RYG program. They
like the idea of being able to use past performance in source
evaluation. He foresees that the program will encourage
contractors with poor performance records to improve the
quality of the material they deliver to the Government. [Ref.
42]
(5) Naval Avionics Center (NAC) . The researcher
interviewed Mr. Wilson, Manager of Acquisition and Improvement
at NAC. He commented that the RYG test was progressing very
well at NAC, and that they are considering expanding the
number of FSCs procured under the program. They are trying to
tailor the test procedures to their operation. [Ref. 43]
Mr. Wilson indicated that the RYG test has
not resulted in a great deal of extra work for contracting
personnel at NAC. He believes that the ease with which they
implemented the program is due in part to the culture at NAC
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which welcomes innovation. He would like to see the CES
expanded to the Buyer Information System described in Chapter
II. He hopes that the validity of the data base can be proven
during the test so that in the future it can be used by
contracting personnel to perform responsibility
determinations. [Ref. 43]
Mr. Wilson explained that most of NAC's
contractor quality problems have been eliminated by
implementation of the Blue Ribbon Contractor program.
Therefore, they have not been able to determine whether the
RYG test program has caused contractors to improve the quality
of the material they supply to NAC. He also indicated that
field activities can make errors impacting on a contractor's
color classification. In one instance at NAC, some test
equipment was improperly programmed. The error resulted in
the erroneous rejection of material supplied by a vendor on
NAC's Blue Ribbon Contractor list. The rejects at NAC caused
the contractor to be classified Red in the RYG data base. The
contractor did not lose any contracts because of his incorrect
color classification. However, it took NAC a couple of months
to investigate and correct the problem after the contractor
questioned his color classification. [Ref. 43]
b. Quality Assurance
(1) NADEP Pensacola . Mr. Hargett, Quality
Developmental Project manager at NADEP Pensacola, was
interviewed to gain perspective on the progress of the RYG
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test implementation in Pensacola. Mr. Hargett explained that
Pensacola had purposely limited the initial application of the
RYG test procedures to allow personnel involved to become
accustomed to them. Their slow start has resulted in little
activity from the test to date. However, involvement in the
test program has caused them to increase the amount of quality
data submitted to NMQAO. As a result, they have added
approximately 1000 vendors to the CES data base. He expects
this increase to cause more activity under the test in the
future. [Ref. 44]
Mr. Hargett indicated that the RYG test
procedures increase the workload of the quality assurance
personnel, but they do not mind devoting the required time.
Because of the test, Mr. Hargett has become deeply involved
with the contracting personnel at NSC Pensacola. He said this
is the first time the two organizations have worked together.
Mr. Hargett has been involved with the RYG program since its
conception. Although he was positive about the test at the
outset, he stated that he is even more positive about the
program now. [Ref. 44]
(2) Charleston Naval Shipyard . The researcher
interviewed Ms. Cassell, Supervisory Quality Assurance
Engineer at the Charleston Naval Shipyard. She indicated that
the test is beginning slowly there. She believes that most of
the delay has been caused by unrealistically low cost
estimates placed on purchase requests by the Shipyard's
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material planners. She explained that often the planners
estimate costs to be less than $2500. As a result, the
purchase requests are not included in the RYG test. When
material is procured, however, the actual costs are usually
greater than $2500. Therefore, procurements that should
qualify for the RYG test are not included because of
inaccurate cost estimates. She indicated that the Quality
Assurance Department at the Shipyard has been working with the
Planning Department to correct this problem. [Ref. 45]
Ms. Cassell is positive about the RYG
program. She believes it highlights the Shipyard's quality
assurance problems to the contracting personnel at NSC
Charleston. She also thinks, however, that the location of
contracting and quality assurance in different commands causes
the Contracting Department at the NSC to be out of touch with
the quality problems experienced by the Shipyard. She
believes this separation may hinder the implementation of the
RYG test. [Ref. 45]
(3) SPCC . The researcher interviewed Mr. Jornov,
Quality Assurance Specialist, Level 1/SS Section, SPCC. He
indicated that SPCC has used the RYG procedures in
approximately 30 solicitations, but has not yet received any
material under the program. So far, they have not received
any complaints from contractors. He explained that they have
limited the implementation to cover only spare parts. They
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later expect to expand the program to include valves, their
major commodity. [Ref. 46]
Mr. Jornov said that the increased work load
has not been burdensome for them, involving approximately one
hour each day. However, the work load will increase if the
program is expanded. He thinks the RYG program is worthwhile.
He believes it needs some fine tuning, but that eventually it
will encourage vendors to improve the quality of their
material. He indicated that he has misgivings about the data
base. He is concerned that some activities may not send data
to NMQAO and that NMQAO may not enter all the data received.
He fears that an incomplete data base may distort contractor
color classifications. [Ref. 46]
(4) NAEC . Mr. Robert Armitage, Quality Assurance
Specialist, Procurement Division, Quality Assurance
Department, NAEC, was interviewed. He indicated that the
extra work required by the RYG test has not been too
burdensome for quality assurance personnel at NAEC. He is
very positive about the program. He believes it is a useful,
viable tool for NAEC. He would like to see the impact the
program has on contractors with poor quality history
strengthened. However, he is glad that the program allows
NAEC to consider quality history to a greater degree than they
had in the past. He said that any new tool that helps them do
their job better is welcome. [Ref. 47]
(5) NAC. The researcher interviewed Ms. Powell,
Electronics Engineer, Quality Assurance Department, NAC. She
indicated that the bulk of the extra work created by the RYG
test has been related to handling contractor complaints.
Investigating complaints generally takes between one and two
weeks. Ms. Powell believes the program is an excellent
concept. It forces commands to correct their data. In
addition, before the RYG test, contractors did not know (or
care) whether their quality history was good. Now they do.
Implementation forces Government activities to communicate
with contractors. [Ref. 48]
Ms. Powell indicated that some of the
contractor complaints have proven to be valid. Therefore, she
believes the weakest part of the program is the data base.
Specifically, she thinks problems may occur in placing
liability (Government or contractor) for quality deficiencies.
[Ref. 48]
c. Analysis of Interviews
None of the people interviewed exhibited a
negative attitude concerning the RYG test program. In
general, quality assurance personnel appeared to be more
positive about the program than contracting personnel.
Although the test requires extra work of both communities,
quality assurance personnel seemed more convinced that the
benefits derived from the program would outweigh the extra
effort. Perhaps their perspective results from a feeling that
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for the first time they have a tool to influence the quality
of material before it is received. The amount of inspection
and documentation quality assurance performs varies inversely
with the quality of material received. Therefore, they
probably perceive that improved quality will simplify receipt
inspection and reduce documentation of quality deficiencies.
This will make their job easier.
Two of the people involved in contracting,
however, were as positive about the program as were quality
assurance personnel. These two people work at the two Navy
Industrial Fund activities involved in the test, NAC
Indianapolis and NAEC Lakehurst. The two contracting people
from the NSCs at Pensacola and Charleston were the two most
concerned about the program. One of the reasons for the
difference in opinion on this program was based on the PURS
used at NSCs. As explained by Mrs. Davidson of NSC
Charleston, this system rewards the NSC for the speed with
which they award contracts and purchase orders. The RYG test
procedures slow down the award process, promising improved
quality at the end of the procurement process. Therefore,
implementation of the RYG program may penalize activities
subject to PURS guidelines. A second reason for the
difference in attitudes may be the location of the contracting
and quality assurance personnel at each test site.
Contracting personnel at NSC Pensacola must work with quality
assurance personnel at NADEP Pensacola; contracting personnel
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at NSC Charleston must work with quality assurance personnel
at the Charleston Naval Shipyard. The NSCs and industrial
activities they support have different missions and different
commanding officers. These distinctions probably make it more
difficult for the two functional areas to understand the
other's concerns and to make the RYG program succeed.
Aside from helping the activities receive better
quality material, the interviewees foresee two peripheral
consequences of the RYG program that are positive. First,
they expect the program to encourage Red and Yellow
contractors to improve the quality of material they supply to
the Government. Second, they indicated that implementation of
the test procedures has forced contracting and quality
assurance personnel to work together. The increased contact
is expected to help the two groups better understand each
other's problems. The end result should be that both groups
are able to do their jobs more effectively.
The biggest area of concern voiced by the test
activities is the validity of the data base. This worry was
expressed by NSC Pensacola, both quality assurance and
contracting at NAC Indianapolis, and quality assurance at
SPCC. This concern corresponds to the assessment of personnel
at the Naval Supply Systems Command and OGC at ASN(S&L)
(described earlier in this chapter) that the greatest
potential for protest of the program lies with the accuracy of
the data base.
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2 . Test Results
The one-year test of the RYG program began 1 August
1989. Not all of the five activities began using the RYG test
procedures on this date, however. Moreover, when they began
the test, several of the activities limited the initial number
of procurements included in the test. Limited implementation
allows the activities to fine tune their internal procedures
before attempting full-scale implementation. Although this
approach is based on sound judgment, it has the peripheral
effect of limiting the amount of available data documenting
the results of the RYG test.
The researcher has collected the data that are
currently available; they are summarized below. Although the
data are scant, an attempt has been made to analyze them and
assess their implications on the progress of the RYG test.






and Insufficient Data (I) contractors will be
presented first. Next, data concerning the status of
procurements under the program will be reported.
Table 1 summarizes the numbers of letters sent to
contractors advising them of their initial color
classification and subsequent status changes and the responses
received by NMQAO. The data in Table 1 indicate that the
initial color classification resulted in 1033 Red and Yellow
contractors. Subsequent monthly updates to the RYG data base
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TABLE 1
RED YELLOW GREEN NOTIFICATION AND RESPONSE









changed contractor color classifications. Each update has
resulted in fewer contractors changing status.
Table 2 describes the categories into which the
responses fell and the action taken by NMQAO in reaction to
them. The data in Table 2 indicate that contractors disagreed
with the data or their color classification in 49 cases (40
disputed the data and nine disagreed with their color
classification) . NMQAO determined that their disagreements
were valid and changed the data in 13 cases. Three of the 13
data base corrections resulted in a change in color
classification. Although 2307 contractors were notified, only
247 (or 10.7 percent) responded. Therefore, the errors
discovered because of these responses cannot be used to
estimate the accuracy of the data base.
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TABLE 2
RESPONSES—CATEGORIES AND ACTION TAKEN
Category of Response Quantity
Information 141










Source: [Ref. 37:p. 9]
The first group of procurements made under the RYG
test are summarized in NMQAO ' s September 1989 status report.
The data relating to these procurements are detailed in Table
3. The data in Table 3 indicate that in most cases the
lowest-priced proposals were submitted by Green and
Insufficient Data contractors. Of the 77 procurements made
under the RYG test, Red and Yellow contractors submitted the
lowest-priced proposals in only ten instances (seven displace-











Awards to RYGI Contractor
Contractors Displacements
Activity R Y G I R Y
NAEC Lakehurst
NAC Indianapolis 3 27 17 5
SPCC Mechanicsburg 18 2
NSC Charleston
NSC Pensacola 12
Total 3 45 29 2 5
Source: [Ref. 37:pp. 1-6]
Yellow contractors) . These ten cases represent 13 percent of
the 77 procurements. The awards made to Yellow contractors
indicate that the Government's consideration of the costs of
quality does not preclude contractors with poor quality-
histories from receiving Government contracts. In other
words, a contractor's color classification does not eliminate
him from the competitive range.
It is too early to determine whether the RYG program
will improve either the quality of material the Government
receives or contractors' motivation to deliver high quality
material. It is also impossible to judge the reaction
contractors will have to displacements caused by the program.
The data do show, however, that the program is having some
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affect on contract awards; Red and Yellow contractors have
lost contracts to higher priced contractors with better
performance histories. The data also show that the test
activities are not using the RYG data base to eliminate
contractors from the competitive range. This should support
the Government's position that application of the RYG formula




This chapter assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the
RYG program. To accomplish this, it first discussed the
ability of the RYG program to withstand protests based on four
arguments—de facto debarment, TEAs as penalties,
responsibility determination, and validity of the data base.
Second, it discussed the progress of RYG test implementation
at the five test activities. Interviews were conducted with
personnel involved with the test at each of the activities and
data related to the test were analyzed. Interviewees
generally felt that the RYG program would yield positive
results. However, several of them expressed concern about the
validity of the data in the CES . The final chapter will
present the conclusions and recommendations of the thesis.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss the conclusions and recommenda-
tions resulting from the thesis research. After presenting
the conclusions and recommendations, the research questions
will be answered. Finally, recommendations will be made
concerning areas for further research.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. The Red Yellow Green CRYG) Program is Appropriate
for Use in Field Contracting Only
The RYG test procedures incorporate a formula driven
assessment of contractor past performance in source
evaluation. The formula used in the test was designed to
assess contractor quality history for groups of relatively
simple commodities. The test procedures were intended to be
easy to apply and, therefore, involve very little subjective
input from contracting and quality-assurance personnel. Major
system contracting would require a much more subjective




The Air Force Contractor Performance Assessment
Reporting System (CPARS) is Appropriate for Major
Systems Procurement Only
CPARS should not be expanded for use in field
contracting. Maintenance of the data for CPARS is very labor
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intensive. The personnel resources required to maintain an
expanded CPARS would prohibit including enough contractors in
the system to make it useful for field contracting. In
addition, use of CPARS in source evaluation requires time and
personnel not available in field contracting offices.
3
.
Blue Ribbon Contractor Programs are Appropriate for
Use at Field Activities in Which Contracting and
Quality Assurance Personnel are Able to Work Together
Unlike RYG, the assessment of contractor performance
history under a Blue Ribbon program is not formula-driven.
The decision to award to a Blue Ribbon contractor over a
lower-priced offeror (not included in the program) requires
an assessment by both contracting and quality-assurance
personnel. Therefore, the two groups must communicate with
each other to use the program effectively.
4
.
RYG and Blue Ribbon Contractor Programs Can Be
Implemented Together and Can Enhance Each Other
A Blue Ribbon program would be used when procuring
critical goods and services because it allows an activity to
concentrate its attention on those parameters that it
considers important. RYG would be used for all other
procurements which do not justify devotion of the resources
needed to apply a Blue Ribbon program.
5 The RYG Program (Especially if Implemented in Conjunc-
tion with a Blue Ribbon Contractor Program) is a
Realistic Method for Initiating Total Quality
Management (TQM) in Field Contracting
The time and personnel required to perform vendor TQM-
assessments make complete TQM implementation in field
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contracting impractical. However, the RYG and Blue Ribbon
Contractor programs allow field contracting activities to
consider contractor past performance in the source selection
decision. Therefore, they allow activities to comply, at
least partially, with one of Deming's 14 principles: "End the
practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag.
Instead, minimize total cost. Move toward a single supplier
for any one item, on a long-term relationship of loyalty and
trust." [Ref. 20:p. 23]
6
.
Application of the RYG Test Procedures Does Not
Constitute De Facto Debarment
Use of the test procedures neither stops the
Government from soliciting offers from nor awarding contracts
to Red and Yellow contractors. If, after considering the
costs related to additional quality assurance requirements, a
Red or Yellow contractor is the lowest priced responsible




The Assessment of Technical Evaluation Adjustments
(TEAS) Under the RYG Test is Reasonable and Does Not
Represent a Penalty to Red and Yellow Contractors
There is precedent for considering costs similar to
TEAS in source evaluation (i.e., consideration of first-
article test and transportation costs) . Therefore, it is
reasonable for the Government to consider the costs of
additional quality assurance requirements in source selection.
TEAS are calculated using historical data for labor hours
92
required for quality assurance actions, labor rates, and costs
of testing. Since their calculation is based on actual costs
the Government would expect to incur when forced to carry out
additional quality assurance actions, TEAs should not be
considered penalties.
8 . If the RYG Test Procedures are Implemented as
Intended, the Government Should Be Able to Support
the Argument that the Use of Past Performance Under
the Test Does Not Constitute a Responsibility
Determination
Precedent from cases in which contractors protested
the use of responsibility-related factors in source evaluation
indicate that responsibility factors may be used in source
evaluation. However, activities must be careful to use such
factors to perform a comparative evaluation of offerors, not
to determine the technical acceptability of proposals. The
RYG test procedures use past performance to better determine
the true cost to the Government of doing business with each
offeror, not to determine the technical acceptability of
proposals.
9 . The Validity of the Contractor Evaluation System (CES)
Data Base Presents the Greatest Potential for Protest
of the RYG Test Procedures
Personnel at the Naval Supply Systems Command and at
several of the activities implementing the RYG test expressed
concern regarding the accuracy of the data in the CES
.
Specifically, they fear that if an activity were to submit
inaccurate data, a contractor could be mistakenly classified
Red or Yellow. If a contractor were to lose a contract
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because of an incorrect classification, he would have a strong
argument to support filing a protest.
10 . It is Possible that Red and Yellow Contractors Will Be
Estopped from Protesting the Validity of the CES
Each Red and Yellow contractor is notified of his
color classification and the performance history behind the
designation. He is given an opportunity to challenge the data
supporting his status under the RYG program. If a contractor
is aware that the data justifying his classification are
incorrect, and he does not respond to correct them within a
reasonable period, he may give up the right to challenge these
errors later during a protest.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Evaluation of RYG at the End of the Test Period
The benefits of the RYG program and its ability to
withstand a protest should be evaluated at the end of the
program test, currently scheduled for 1 August 1990. There
are not enough data currently available to evaluate whether
the benefits of the RYG program outweigh the costs of
implementation. The positive comments expressed by personnel
at the five activities involved in the test suggest that the
program will be beneficial. However, an assessment concerning
whether the program improves contractor performance must
eventually be made. Such an evaluation should include
reviewing quality records at the five test activities to
determine whether the quality of incoming material has
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improved. In addition, a sample of contractors should be
evaluated to determine whether the RYG program has encouraged
them to improve their performance.
2
.
Continuation of the RYG Program After Completion of
the Test
If there are not enough data to adequately assess the
value of the RYG program at the end of the test period, use of
the test procedures should be continued until the program can
be properly evaluated. Contractor evaluation, as described in
the previous paragraph, will require the passage of enough
time for contractors to become aware of the effects of the RYG
program, change their performance, and deliver enough material
to the Government to document that change in performance. The
criteria used to designate contractors as Red, Yellow, and
Green span periods up to two years. Therefore, it is probable
that an accurate evaluation of the affect the RYG program has
on contractors will require more than the one year of data
that will be accumulated under the test. Since the program
has the potential to yield such positive results, its use




Implementation of Blue Ribbon Contractor Programs with
RYG
If the RYG program is determined to be beneficial,
activities should be encouraged to implement a tailored Blue
Ribbon Contractor program in conjunction with RYG. As
discussed in the Conclusions section of this chapter, RYG and
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Blue Ribbon Contractor programs can enhance each other. In
addition, they both move field contracting offices toward
implementation of TQM. Therefore, implementing them together
should prove beneficial to the Department of Defense (DOD)
.
D. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. How is the Navy's Red Yellow Green Program Structured
and How is it Intended to Improve the Quality of
Material Procured by the Navy?
The RYG program uses contractor performance history in
source evaluation. The program uses this history in one of
two ways. The first approach uses a contractor's quality
history to determine whether the Government will require
additional quality assurance actions when doing business with
the contractor. If the contractor's performance history is
good, additional quality assurance actions will not be
required; if his history is poor, additional actions will be
required. If additional quality assurance is required, the
costs of performance to the Government are added to the
contractor's proposal using TEAs. The source selection
decision is made using the proposed prices of Green
contractors and the adjusted prices of Red and Yellow
contractors.
The second approach involves a more subjective use of
contractor performance history. A source selection plan is
prepared by quality assurance personnel, specifying the
criteria to be used in evaluating Red, Yellow, and Green
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contractors. When proposals are received, quality assurance
personnel assign ratings to each offeror based on the criteria
outlined in the source selection plan. Contracting personnel
award the contract based on the scores received by
contractors, considering their quality and price ratings.
The RYG program is intended to improve the quality of
material procured by the Navy in two ways. First,
consideration of contractor quality history in source
evaluation should result in a higher percentage of contract
awards to contractors with good performance history. This is
expected to improve the quality of material received. Second,
the program should encourage contractors with poor quality
histories to improve their performance in order to receive
more Government contracts in the future.
2 . How are Red, Yellow, and Green Contractors Defined?
A Red contractor is considered a high quality risk.
His performance history is poor. It warrants requirement of
special quality assurance actions and higher-level review
before contract award. A Yellow contractor is considered a
moderate quality risk. His performance history is poor enough
to warrant requirement of special quality assurance actions.
A Green contractor is considered a low quality risk. His
performance history is good and, therefore, warrants no
special quality assurance actions.
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3.
What are the Other Current Contractor Quality
Initiatives within POD?
The other current quality initiatives within DOD are
the Air Force CPARS, the Naval Avionics Center (NAC)
Indianapolis Blue Ribbon Contractor program, and the DOD TQM
initiative.
4 How Does RYG Compare and Contrast to These Other
Programs?
RYG and CPARS were designed to be used in different
areas of procurement. RYG is intended to be employed by field
contracting activities. CPARS is intended for major systems'
procurement. RYG and NAC ' s Blue Ribbon Contractor program are
both intended for use in field contracting. The Blue Ribbon
program requires an activity to devote more resources to and
employ more judgment in contractor performance evaluation than
does RYG. It would be impractical for some activities to
implement a Blue Ribbon Contractor program. However,
implementation of such a program can enhance the results
expected of the RYG program. The RYG program is consistent
with the goals of the DOD TQM initiative. It helps field
contracting offices to begin implementation of TQM.
5
.
What are the Strengths and Weaknesses Associated with
RYG?
The RYG program has many strengths. It allows use of
contractor performance history in the source selection
decision and so should improve the quality of material
received by the Government. It requires few resources to
98
implement and, therefore, can be used by field contracting
offices. It forces contracting and quality-assurance
personnel to work together. It forces Government activities
to communicate with industry. The program does have some
weaknesses, however. The data base used in the program is
very large, and its accuracy cannot be currently assessed. If
the data base proves inaccurate, the program is built on a
weak foundation. The program's evaluation of contractor
performance history is formula-driven. Therefore, it is only
appropriate for procurement of relatively simple commodities.
6 . How is the RYG Program Being Tested in the Market?
The RYG program is being tested at five Navy field
activities. Interviews with personnel at the test activities
indicate that the test began slowly but is progressing well.
Both contracting and quality assurance personnel expressed
positive opinions about the program. There are currently too
few data, however, to assess the success of the test.
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
One area for further research is to evaluate the benefits
of the RYG program after the one-year test period. More data
will be available at this point and, therefore, a researcher
will be better able to assess the merits of the program.
Another area for further research is to determine how NAC ' s
Blue Ribbon Contractor program could be exported to other
activities. The Blue Ribbon program has proven very
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red yellow green classification criteria
classification criteria
on current navy vdar
method c, d, and/or e currently in effect
quality info on latest pre-award survey
(pas) within last year—no award
d latest product-oriented survey (pos) in
last two years unacceptable
e latest quality system review (qsr) in last
two years unacceptable
f latest special survey in last two years
unacceptable
g reject rate 15% or more in last two years
for five or more lots
h two or more unsat first article tests
(fat) in last year
j two or more category "i" qdrs in last year
k six or more category "ii" action qdrs in
last year
l six or more contractor liable rods in last
year"
m six or more contractor liable waivers/
deviations in last year"
n on dla contractor alert list for major
deficiencies"
Classification criteria L, M, N for "Red" and "Yellow"
have not yet been incorporated.
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COLOR CODE CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA
YELLOW A ISSUED VDAR LETTER OF CONCERN
B PREVIOUSLY CLASSIFIED "RED"
C LATEST PAS IN LAST TWO YEARS—AWARD WITH
FINDINGS
D LATEST POS IN LAST TWO YEARS ACCEPTABLE
WITH CORRECTIONS
E LATEST QSR IN LAST TWO YEARS ACCEPTABLE
WITH CORRECTIONS
F LATEST SPECIAL SURVEY IN LAST TWO YEARS
ACCEPTABLE WITH CORRECTIONS
G REJECT RATE 6-14% FOR FIVE OR MORE
LOTS/ANY REJECT RATE FOR LESS THAN FIVE
LOTS IN LAST TWO YEARS
H ONE UNSAT FAT IN LAST YEAR
J ONE CATEGORY "I" QDR IN LAST YEAR
K THREE-FIVE CATEGORY "II" ACTION QDRS IN
LAST YEAR
L THREE-FIVE CONTRACTOR LIABLE RODS IN LAST
YEAR''
M THREE-FIVE CONTRACTOR LIABLE WAIVERS/
DEVIATIONS IN LAST YEAR"
N ON DLA CONTRACTOR ALERT LIST FOR MINOR
DEFICIENCIES''
V
"classification criteria L, M, N for "Red" and "Yellow"
have not yet been incorporated.
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COLOR CODE CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA
GREEN C LATEST PAS IN LAST TWO YEARS—AWARD WITH
NO FINDINGS
D LATEST POS IN LAST TWO YEARS ACCEPTABLE
E LATEST QDR IN LAST TWO YEARS ACCEPTABLE
F LATEST SPECIAL SURVEY IN LAST TWO YEARS
ACCEPTABLE
G REJECT RATE LESS THAN 6% IN LAST TWO YEARS
FOR FIVE OR MORE LOTS
H ALL FAT IN LAST YEAR SATISFACTORY
K ONE-TWO CATEGORY "II" ACTION QDRS IN LAST
YEAR
L ONE-TWO CONTRACTOR LIABLE RODS IN LAST
YEAR*
M ONE-TWO CONTRACTOR LIABLE WAIVERS/
DEVIATIONS IN LAST YEAR*'




CLAUSES FOR SIMPLIFIED SMALL PURCHASE PROCEDURES
NOTICE TO PROSPECTIVE OFFERORS (NOV 1988)
(a) This procurement is subject to a test of the Navy's
Contractor Evaluation System (CES) , "Red/Yellow/Green" (R/Y/G)
program. The test is authorized by the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics) for the acquisition of
specific commodities within designated Federal Supply Classes
(FSCs) by participating test activities.
(b) The Government reserves the right to award to the
contractor whose offer represents the best overall purchase
value to the Government. As such, the basis for contract
award will include an evaluation of proposed contractors' past
quality performance history on the particular commodity or
commodities, identified below, as recorded in the CES. The
price to be considered in determining best value will be the
evaluated price after Technical Evaluation Adjustments (TEAs)
for related quality assurance actions, as applicable, are
applied to the offered price.
(c) The procedures described in the clause of this
solicitation entitled "ADDITIONAL EVALUATION FACTORS—TEST OF
CONTRACTOR EVALUATION SYSTEM (NOV 1988)" will be used by the
contracting officer to assist in determining the best purchase
value for the Government
—
price, past quality performance, and
other factors considered.
(d) The commodities included in this test, as currently
solicited, are:
FSC No. FSC Nomenclature CLIN
V
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ADDITIONAL EVALUATION FACTORS—TEST OF CONTRACTOR EVALUATION
SYSTEM (NOV 1988) (SIMPLIFIED SMALL PURCHASE PROCEDURES)
(a) This procurement is part of a test of the Navy's
Contractor Evaluation System (CES) "Red/Yellow/Green" (R/Y/G)
Program, authorized by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics) , for the acquisition of specific
commodities by participating activities. At the end of the
test, data concerning awards made during the period will be
evaluated to assess the program's effectiveness and impact on
the acquisition process.
(b) The purpose of R/Y/G is to assist contracting personnel
during source selection to determine the best value for the
Government--price, past quality performance, and other factors
considered. The test program uses accumulated contractor
quality performance data to classify contractor's performance
on select commodities as either "Red" (high risk) , "Yellow"
(moderate risk), "Green" (low risk), or "Insufficient Data,"
based on the degree of risk to the Government of receiving
poor quality products. Such classifications are then used to
apply a Technical Evaluation Adjustment (TEA) during source
selection.
(c) A TEA is a monetary assessment added to the price of
selected commodities that have been classified as either "Red"
or "Yellow" for specific contractors, and is based on the cost
to the Government for effecting additional quality
considerations that would otherwise not be required if award
were made to a contractor with a satisfactory performance
history. For purposes of requirements using the simplified
small purchasing procedures, standardized TEAs have been
established for the "Red" and the "Yellow" classifications.
During evaluation of quotations, the applicable TEA is added
to the quoted price of the "Red" and/or "Yellow" commodity,
and after consideration of any other pertinent price-related
factors (e.g., transportation charges. First Article Testing,
discount terms, etc.) , becomes the basis for determining award
of the purchase order. A commodity's classification may
change over time as new or revised quality performance data
become available.
(d) Classifications for the test program are summarized as
follows
:
"Green"--Low risk. No extraordinary quality requirements or
additional actions required; satisfactory quality history.
"Yellow"—Moderate risk. History of quality problems; special
quality requirements/actions needed; Technical Evaluation
Adjustment (TEA) applied to offered price.
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"Red"—High risk. Special alert to history of poor quality
performance; TEA applied to offered price (s), and contract
award requires higher level approval.
"Insufficient Data"—Generally, may be commodities of first-
time offerors or offerors for whom current, up-to-date quality
performance history is unavailable; additional quality actions
may be needed and invoked; however, a TEA is not assessed.
(e) Prospective offerors may address questions with regard to
their assessment classification on particular commodities to:
Naval Sea System Command Detachment, Naval Material Quality
Assessment Office (NMQAO) , Federal Building, Room 423, 80




CLAUSES FOR MAJOR PURCHASE PROCEDURES
NOTICE TO PROSPECTIVE OFFERORS (NOV 1988)
(a) This procurement is subject to a test of the Navy's
Contractor Evaluation System (CES) , "Red/Yellow/Green" (R/Y/G)
program. The test is authorized by the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics) for the acquisition of
specific commodities within designated Federal Supply Classes
(FSCs) by participating test activities.
(b) The Government reserves the right to award to the
contractor whose offer represents the best overall purchase
value to the Government. As such, the basis for contract
award will include an evaluation of proposed contractors' past
quality performance history on the particular commodity or
commodities, identified below, as recorded in the CES. The
price to be considered in determining best value will be the
evaluated price after Technical Evaluation Adjustments (TEAs)
for related quality-assurance actions, as applicable, are
applied to the offered price.
(c) The procedures described in the clause of this
solicitation entitled "ADDITIONAL EVALUATION FACTORS—TEST OF
CONTRACTOR EVALUATION SYSTEM (NOV 1988)" will be used by the
contracting officer to assist in determining the best purchase
value for the Government
—
price, past quality performance, and
other factors considered.
(d) The commodities included in this test, as currently
solicited, are:
FSC No. FSC Nomenclature CLIN
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ADDITIONAL EVALUATION FACTORS—TEST OF CONTRACTOR EVALUATION
SYSTEM (NOV 198 8) (MAJOR PURCHASE PROCEDURES)
(a) This procurement is part of a test of the Navy's
Contractor Evaluation System (CES) "Red/Yellow/Green" (R/Y/G)
Program, authorized by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics) , for the acquisition of specific
commodities by participating activities. At the end of the
test, data concerning awards made during the period will be
evaluated to assess the program's effectiveness and impact on
the acquisition process.
(b) The purpose of R/Y/G is to assist contracting personnel
during source selection to determine the best value for the
Government
—
price, past quality performance, and other factors
considered. The test program uses accumulated contractor
quality performance data to classify contractor's performance
on select commodities as either "Red" (high risk) , "Yellow"
(moderate risk), "Green" (low risk), or "Insufficient Data,"
based on the degree of risk to the Government of receiving
poor quality products. Such classifications are then used to
apply a Technical Evaluation Adjustment (TEA) during source
selection.
(c) A TEA is a monetary assessment added to the price of
selected commodities that have been classified as either "Red"
or "Yellow" for specific contractors, and is based on the cost
to the Government for effecting additional quality
considerations that would otherwise not be required if award
were made to a contractor with a satisfactory performance
history. During evaluation of quotations, the necessity for
any additional quality assurance requirements will be
determined, and the applicable TEA will be assessed onto the
quoted price of the "Red" and/or "Yellow" commodity. After
consideration of any other pertinent price-related factors
(e.g., transportation charges. First Article Testing, discount
terms, etc.), this adjusted price becomes the basis for
determining award of the purchase order. A commodity's
classification may change over time as new or revised quality
performance data become available.
(d) Classifications for the test program are summarized as
follows
:
"Green"—Low risk. No extraordinary quality requirements or
additional actions required; satisfactory quality history.
"Yellow"—Moderate risk. History of quality problems; special
quality requirements/actions needed; Technical Evaluation
Adjustment (TEA) applied to offered price.
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"Red"—High risk. Special alert to history of poor quality
performance; TEA applied to offered price(s), and contract
award requires higher level approval.
"Insufficient Data"—Generally, may be commodities of first-
time offerors or offerors for whom current, up-to-date quality
performance history is unavailable; additional quality actions
may be needed and invoked; however, a TEA is not assessed.
(e) Prospective offerors may address questions with regard to
their assessment classification on particular commodities to:
Naval Sea System Command Detachment, Navy Material Quality
Assessment Office (NMQAO) , Federal Building, Room 423, 80




GUIDELINE FOR TEA ASSIGNMENT
RED CLASSIFICATION
CODE CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA
A On Current Navy VDAR
(Time Frame—Six Months)
B DLA Corrective Action
Methods C, D, or E Currently
in Effect


















































G Material Inspection Records
Reject Rate 15% or Greater
Indicated
(Minimum Five Lots in Two Years)
H First Article Test
Two or More Unsat
(Time Frame—One Year)
Quality Deficiency Reports—Cat I
Two or More Unsat
(Time Frame—One Year)
K Quality Deficiency Reports
—
Cat II
Six or More "Action" Cat II
(Time Frame—One Year)
L Report of Discrepancy




Six or More Contractor Liable
Requests
(Time Frame—One Year)
N DLA Contractor Alert List
Listed for Major Deficiencies






































































VDAR Discussion Contractor or
Letter of Concern Issued
(Time Frame—Six Months)
B Previously Classified "Red"
(Time Frame—Six Months)
C Latest Pre-Award Survey
Positive for Quality but
Negative in
One or More Other Categories
(Time Frame—Two Years)
D Latest Product Oriented Survey 4
Unsat for Minor Problems—No 5 or 6
Impact on Product Quality
(Time Frame—Two Years)
E Latest Quality System Review 4
Unsat For Minor Problems 5 or 6
on Product Quality
(Time Frame—Two Years)
F Latest Quality Audit/Special 4
Survey 5 or 6
Unsat for Minor Problems—No
Impact on Product Quality
(Time Frame—Two Years)
G Material Inspection Reports 4
Reject Rate Greater Than 5% 5 or 6
but less than 15% Indicated 7
(Based on Minimum of Five Lots
in Two Years)
H First Article Test 2A
One Unsat 4




J Quality Deficiency Reports—Cat I
One Cat I
(Time Frame—One Year)
K Quality Deficiency Reports--Cat II
More Than Two but Less Than Six
Cat II
(Time Frame—One Year)
L Report of Discrepancy




More Than Two but Less Than Six
Contractor Liable Requests
(Time Frame—One Year)
N DLA Contractor Alert List
Listed for Minor Deficiencies
—






















ADDITIONAL QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS




Quality Survey $ 500














3 . Product Oriented Survey—Procurement




4. Government Source Inspection'^" 500
5. Receipt Inspection at Source--Navy
representative with DCAS participation
(1) Local^^ 650
(2) Intermediate^^ 1,3 60
(3) Distant^^ 2,182





7. Quality Assurance Letter of Instruction'^'' 755
8. Purchase Referrals^® 640
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TEA CALCULATIONS
^Calculated $30/hr x 8 hrs = $240 + $35 mileage = $275 +
500.
^Calculated $30/hr x 8 hrs = $240 + $240 (8 hrs travel @
$30/hr) + $200 (2 days per diem @ $100/day) + $200 travel
costs = $880 + $500.
^Calculated $30/hr x 8 hrs = $240 + $480 (16 hrs travel @
$30/hr) + $300 ( 3 days per diem @ $100/day) = $575 travel
costs = $1,595 + $500.
''Calculated $30/hr x 16 hrs = $480 + $45 mileage = $525 +
$550.
^Calculated $30/hr x 16 hrs = $480 + $480 (16 hrs travel @
$30/hr) + $400 (4 days per diem @ $100/day) + $300 travel
costs = $1,660 + $550.
^Calculated $30/hr x 16 hrs = $480 + $960 (32 hrs travel @
$30/hr) + $600 (6 days per diem @ $100/day) + $1,000 travel
costs = $3,040 + $550.
^Calculated $30/hr x 12 hrs = $360 + $40 mileage = $400 +
$400 (DCAS costs)
.
^Calculated $30/hr x 12 hrs = $360 + $240 (8 hrs travel (a
$30/hr) + $300 ( 3 days per diem (a $100/day) + $200 travel
costs = $1,100 + $400 (DCAS costs).
^Calculated $30/hr x 12 hrs = $360 + $480 (16 hrs travel @
$30/hr) + $400 (4 days per diem § $100/day) + $575 travel
costs = $1,815 + $400 (DCAS costs).
^"calculated $34.18/hr x 14 hrs.
^^Calculated $43/hr x 8 hrs = $344 + $31 mileage = $375 +
$275 (DCAS costs)
^^Calculated $43/hr x 8 hrs = $344 + $344 (8 hrs travel @
$43/hr) + $200 ( 2 days per diem @ $100/day) + $200 travel
costs = $1,088 + $275 (DCAS costs).
^^Calculated $43/hr x 8 hrs = $344 + $688 (16 hrs travel @
$43/hr) + $300 ( 3 days per diem @ $100/day) + $575 travel
costs = $1,907 + @275 (DCAS costs).
^'calculated $43/hr x 4 hrs = $172 + $100 material handling +
$325 test.
^^Calculated $43/hr x 8 hrs = $344 + $200 material handling +
$650 test.
115
^^Calculated $43/hr x 24 hrs = $1,032 + $500 material
handling + $800 test.
^'calculated DCAS @ $34.18/hr x 8 hrs = $275 + $480
(procurement representative @ $30/hr x 16 hrs)
.
^^Calculated procurement representative @ $40/hr x 16 hrs
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APPENDIX E
CLAUSES FOR FIXED PRICE—GREATEST VALUE PROCEDURES
NOTICE TO PROSPECTIVE OFFERORS (NOV 1988)
(a) This procurement is subject to a test of the Navy's
Contractor Evaluation System (CES) "Red/Yellow/Green" (R/Y/G)
program. The test is authorized by the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics) for the acquisition of
specific commodities within designated Federal Supply Classes
(FSCs) by participating test activities.
(b) The Government reserves the right to award to the
contractor whose offer represents the best overall purchase
value to the Government. As such, the basis for contract
award will include an evaluation of proposed contractors' past
quality performance history on the particular commodity or
commodities, identified below, as recorded in the CES.
(c) The procedures described in the clause of this
solicitation entitled "ADDITIONAL EVALUATION FACTORS—TEST OF
CONTRACTOR EVALUATION SYSTEM (NOV 1988)" will be used by the
contracting officer to assist in determining the best purchase
value for the Government
—
price, past quality performance, and
other factors considered.
(d) The commodities included in this test, as currently
solicited, are:
FSCNp. FSC Nomenclature CLIN
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ADDITIONAL EVALUATION FACTORS—TEST OF CONTRACTOR EVALUATION
SYSTEM (NOV 1988) (FIXED PRICE-GREATEST VALUE PROCEDURES)
(a) This procurement is part of a test of the Navy's
Contractor Evaluation System (CES) "Red/Yellow/Green" (R/Y/G)
Program, authorized by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics) , for the acquisition of specific
commodities by participating activities. At the end of the
test, data concerning awards made during the period will be
evaluated to assess the program's effectiveness and impact on
the acquisition process.
(b) The purpose of R/Y/G is to assist contracting personnel
during source selection to determine the best value for the
Government
—
price, past quality performance, and other factors
considered. The test program uses accumulated contractor
quality performance data to classify contractor's performance
on select commodities as either "Red" (high risk) , "Yellow"
(moderate risk), "Green" (low risk), or "Insufficient Data,"
based on the degree of risk to the Government of receiving
poor quality products. A commodity's classification may
change over time as new or revised quality performance data
become available.
(c) For purposes of source evaluation and selection, both the
color classification of an offeror's commodity and the
proposed price (s) shall be evaluated in accordance with
weighted evaluation criteria established by the Government
prior to the receipt of proposals. Price-related factors,
such as transportation charges, discount terms, the cost of
First Article Test, etc., will also be considered; however,
no score or rating shall be applied.
(d) Offerors are advised that, although price is of
significance in determining the successful offeror, past
quality performance on the proposed commodity (as classified
with the R-Y-G database) is essentially more important, and
shall be evaluated accordingly. Each of the R-Y-G
classifications and its relative order of importance is
summarized as follows:
"Green"—Low risk. No extraordinary quality requirements or
additional actions required; satisfactory quality history.
Commodities within this classification are apportioned a
greater weight or value in the evaluation than those
classified as either "Yellow" or "Red."
"Yellow"—Moderate risk. History of quality problems; special
quality requirements/actions may be needed. Due to the
additional quality assurance considerations that may be
necessary, commodities within this classification are weighted
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less than those classified as "Green", but are of greater
value than those within the "Red" category.
"Red"—High risk. Special alert to history of poor quality
performance; contract award requires higher level approval.
These commodities are apportioned the least available weight
or value for past quality performance relative to commodities
within the "Green" or "Yellow" classifications.
"Insufficient Data"—Generally, may be commodities of first-
time offerors or offerors for whom current, up-to-date quality
performance history is unavailable; additional quality actions
may be needed and invoked; however, commodities within this
classification shall be evaluated solely on the basis of price
and related factors. Past quality performance will not be a
consideration in the evaluation of commodities for which
current quality performance data is not set forth within the
database.
(e) Prospective offerors may address questions with regard to
their assessment classification on particular commodities to;
Naval Sea System Command Detachment, Navy Material Quality
Assessment Office (NMQAO) , Federal Building, Room 423, 80




SAMPLE EVALUATION UNDER FIXED PRICE—GREATEST
VALUE PROCEDURES
Source Selection/Evaluation Method
Total Points (Maximum) = 100 points (%)
Total Technical =60 points (%)
Price =40 points (%)
Classification Adjective Numerical Rating
Green Excellent 55-60 points
II Good 40-54 points
Yellow Good 35-39 points
" Average 25-34 points
" Marginal 16-24 points
Red Marginal 10-15 points
" Unacceptable 0-14 points
Evaluation Measurements
Yellow Classification Adjective Numerical Rating
Reject Rate = 6%-8% Good 35-39 points
(Code G)
Reject Rate = 9%-ll% Average 25-34 points
(Code G)
Reject Rate = 12%-14% Marginal 16-24 points
(Code G)
3 Category "II"
action QDRs Good 35-39 points
(Code K)
4 Category "II"
action QDRs Average 25-34 points
(Code K)
5 Category "II"
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